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THE VIRTUES OF MODERATION
James Grimmelmann
17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42 (2015)
ABSTRACT
TL;DR—On a Friday in 2005, the Los Angeles Times
launched an experiment: a “wikitorial” on the Iraq War that any
of the paper’s readers could edit. By Sunday, the experiment
had ended in abject failure: vandals overran it with crude profanity and graphic pornography. The wikitorial took its inspiration and its technology from Wikipedia, but missed something
essential about how the “the free encyclopedia that anyone can
edit” staves off abuse while maintaining its core commitment to
open participation.
The difference is moderation: the governance mechanisms
that structure participation in a community to facilitate cooperation and prevent abuse. Town meetings have moderators, and
so do online communities. A community’s moderators can promote posts or hide them, honor posters or shame them, recruit
users or ban them. Their decisions influence what is seen, what
is valued, what is said. They create the conditions under which
cooperation is possible.
This Article provides a novel taxonomy of moderation in
online communities. It breaks down the basic verbs of moderation—exclusion, pricing, organizing, and norm-setting—and
shows how they help communities walk the tightrope between
the chaos of too much freedom and the sterility of too much control. Scholars studying the commons can learn from moderation, and so can policy-makers debating the regulation of online
communities.
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Building a community is pretty tough; it requires just the right combination of technology and rules and people. And while it’s been
clear that communities are at the core of
many of the most interesting things on the Internet, we’re still at the very early stages of understanding what it is that makes them work.
–Aaron Swartz1
INTRODUCTION
If you’ve never seen the image known as “goatse,” trust
me—you don’t want to.2 But if you have, you understand why it
was such a disaster when this notoriously disgusting photograph showed up on the website of the Los Angeles Times on
June 19, 2005.3 It wasn’t a hack. The newspaper had invited its
readers to post whatever they wanted. One of them posted a
gaping anus.
It had started off innocently enough. Inspired by Wikipedia,
the Times launched a “wikitorial,” an editorial that any of the
paper’s readers could edit.4 At first, readers fought over its position: should it be for or against the Iraq War?5 Then one
boiled the argument down to its essence—“Fuck USA”—
touching off an edit war of increasingly rapid and radically incompatible changes.6 By the second day, trolls were posting
hardcore pornography, designed to shock and disgust.7 The
Times pulled the plug entirely in less than forty-eight hours.8
What had started with “Rewrite the editorial yourself”9 ended
1

2

3

4

5
6
7
8

9

Aaron Swartz, Making More Wikipedias, RAW THOUGHT (Sept. 14, 2006),
http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/morewikipedias [http://perma.cc/U2LR-C
DTB].
The image, which has circulated on the Internet since 1999, depicts a man
exposing himself to the camera in a particularly graphic and unpleasant
way. In its heyday, goatse was most often used for its shock value: direct
people to a website containing it, and revel in their horror. See Adrian
Chen, Finding Goatse: The Mystery Man Behind the Most Disturbing Internet Meme in History, GAWKER, Apr. 10, 2012, http://gawker.com/findinggoatse-the-mystery-man-behind-the-most-disturb-5899787
[http://perma.cc/6RJ8-WVAW].
See, e.g., Dan Glaister, LA Times ‘Wikitorial’ Gives Editors Red Face, THE
GUARDIAN, June 21, 2005, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2005
/jun/22/media.pressandpublishing [http://perma.cc/NY5A-3A83].
A Wiki for Your Thoughts, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2005, http://www.latimes
.com/news/la-ed-wiki17jun17-story.html [http://perma.cc/4QW8-RH7C].
Glaister, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
James Rainey, ‘Wikitorial’ Pulled Due to Vandalism, L.A. TIMES, June 21,
2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jun/21/nation/na-wiki21 [http://perm
a.cc/TJ2J-AD7S].
A Wiki for Your Thoughts, supra note 4.
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with the admission that “a few readers were flooding the site
with inappropriate material.”10
The wikitorial debacle has the air of a parable: the Los Angeles Times hung a “KICK ME” sign on its website, and of
course it got kicked. Open up an online community, and of
course you’ll bring out the spammers, the vandals, and the
trolls. That’s just how people act on the Internet. But consider
this: the Times’ model, Wikipedia, is going into its thirteenth
year.11 It is the sixth most-visited website on the Internet.12
And despite being a website “that anyone can edit,” it remains
almost entirely goatse-free.13 Anarchy on the Internet is not
inevitable. Spaces can and do flourish where people collaborate
and where all are welcome. What, then, separates the Wikipedias from the wikitorials? Why do some communities thrive
while others become ghost towns?
The difference is moderation. Just as town meetings and
debates have moderators who keep the discussion civil and
productive,14 healthy online communities have moderators who
facilitate communication. A community’s moderators can promote posts or hide them, honor posters or shame them, recruit
users or ban them. Their decisions influence what is seen, what
is valued, what is said. When they do their job right, they create the conditions under which cooperation is possible. Wikipedia, for all its faults, is moderated in a way that supports an
active community of mostly productive editors. The Los Angeles
Times, for all its good intentions, moderated the wikitorial in a
way that provided few useful defenses against vandals. Wikipedia’s moderation keeps its house in order; the Times gave
arsonists the run of the place.
This Article is a guided tour of moderation for legal scholars. It synthesizes the accumulated insights of four groups of
experts who have given the problem of moderation their careful
and sustained attention. The first is moderators themselves—
those who are entrusted with the care and feeding of online
10
11
12

13

14

Rainey, supra note 8.
See generally ANDREW LIH, THE WIKIPEDIA REVOLUTION (2009).
See Top Sites, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/topsites [http://perma.cc/36H3
-9STW] (last visited Mar. 30, 2015); see also Wikipedia: Statistics, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Statistics#pageviews [http:
//perma.cc/HW25-U4WS] (last visited Jan. 20, 2015) (reporting 4,841,082
articles in the English-language version).
But see goatse.cx, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goatse.cx [http://
perma.cc/7YQD-EBGH] (last visited Feb. 23, 2015) (telling rather than
showing).
See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 25-26 (1948) (“[A]t a town meeting . . . [n]o competent
moderator would tolerate . . . wasting . . . the time available for free discussion,” but “no suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing because it
is on one side of the issue rather than another.”).
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communities. They have written at length about helpful interventions and harmful ones, giving guidelines and rules of
thumb for nudging users towards collaborative engagement.15
A second group, the software and interface designers who are
responsible for the technical substrate on which online communities run, works closely with the first (indeed, they are often the same people). Their own professional literature offers a
nuanced understanding of how the technical design of a social
space influences the interactions that take place there.16 The
third group consists of academics from a wide variety of disciplines—psychology, communications, and computer science, to
name just a few—who have turned a scholarly eye on the factors that make communities thrive or wither.17 The fourth is

15

16

17

See generally JONO BACON, THE ART OF COMMUNITY: BUILDING THE NEW
AGE OF PARTICIPATION (2d ed. 2012); AMY JO KIM, COMMUNITY BUILDING ON
THE WEB (2000); DEBORAH NG, ONLINE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT FOR
DUMMIES (2011); DEREK POWAZEK, DESIGN FOR COMMUNITY (2001); JENNY
PREECE, ONLINE COMMUNITIES: DESIGNING USABILITY, SUPPORTING SOCIABILITY (2000).
See generally GAVIN BELL, BUILDING SOCIAL WEB APPLICATIONS (2009);
CHRISTIAN CRUMLISH & ERIN MALONE, DESIGNING SOCIAL INTERFACES
(2009); F. RANDALL FARMER & BRYCE GLASS, BUILDING WEB REPUTATION
SYSTEMS (2010); JENIFER TIDWELL, DESIGNING INTERFACES (2d ed. 2010). A
particularly fruitful trend in this literature consists of pattern languages:
interlocking networks of design elements that have repeatedly proven
their worth. The idea of pattern languages comes from the work of the architectural theorist Christopher Alexander. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER, THE TIMELESS WAY OF BUILDING (1979) (presenting a theory of patterns); CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER ET AL., A PATTERN LANGUAGE: TOWNS,
BUILDINGS, CONSTRUCTION (1977) (developing pattern language for architecture). Software designers took his idea of a pattern as “a careful description of a perennial solution to a recurring problem within a building
context,” Aims & Goals, PATTERNLANGUAGE.COM, http://www.patternlangu
age.com/aims/intro.html [http://perma.cc/9BE6-BM4A], and generalized it
to technical problems in computer system design. See, e.g., ERICH GAMMA
ET AL., DESIGN PATTERNS: ELEMENTS OF REUSABLE OBJECT-ORIENTED SOFTWARE (1994); RICHARD P. GABRIEL, PATTERNS OF SOFTWARE: TALES FROM
THE SOFTWARE COMMUNITY (1996). From there, it was only a small step to
develop patterns describing how people use software; indeed, these interaction patterns come closest to Alexander’s goal of finding patterns that
make “towns and buildings . . . able to come alive.” ALEXANDER, A PATTERN
LANGUAGE, supra, at x. Notable examples of pattern languages for social
interactions using software include MEATBALLWIKI, http://meatballwiki.or
g/wiki [http://perma.cc/9RUZ-YZNK]; YAHOO DESIGN PATTERN LIBRARY,
https://developer.yahoo.com/ypatterns/
[https://perma.cc/RAZ6-N4XM];
and ONLINE MODERATION STRATEGIES, https://web.archive.org/web/200704
19071423/http://social.itp.nyu.edu/shirky/wiki [https://perma.cc/NWZ2-W
M5L]. This Article uses a different analytical structure to describe moderation, but the themes of these pattern languages inform the thinking behind it.
For an outstanding synthesis of the literature, see ROBERT E. KRAUT &
PAUL RESNICK, BUILDING SUCCESSFUL ONLINE COMMUNITIES: EVIDENCEBASED SOCIAL DESIGN (2012).
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made up of journalists who cover the online beat by embedding
themselves in communities (often in moments of high drama).18
The Article draws on these various sources to present a
novel taxonomy of moderation. The taxonomy takes the form of
a grammar—a set of nouns, verbs, adverbs, and adjectives
suitable for describing the vast array of moderation techniques
in common use on the Internet. The Article describes these
techniques in terms of familiar jurisprudential categories such
as ex ante versus ex post and norms versus architecture. This
richer understanding of moderation should be useful to scholars and regulators in two ways. One is theoretical: wellmoderated online communities catalyze human cooperation.
Studying them can provide insights into the management of
common-pool resources and the creation of information goods,
two problems moderation must solve simultaneously. Studying
online communities is thus like studying fisheries or fan fiction—a way to understand society. The other payoff is practical. Many laws either regulate the activities of online communities or exempt them from regulation. The wisdom of these
choices depends on empirical facts about the value and power
of moderation. Regulators cannot properly evaluate these laws
without paying close attention to how moderation plays out on
the ground.
Part I of the Article provides basic definitions and describes
the dual commons problems that online communities confront.
Part II supplies the detailed grammar of moderation, liberally
annotated with examples. Part III presents four case studies of
moderation in action: Wikipedia, the Los Angeles Times wikitorial, MetaFilter, and Reddit. Part IV offers some lessons for
regulators by examining the two most important statutes that
regulate moderation: § 230 of the Communications Decency
Act, and § 512 of the Copyright Act. Part V concludes.
I.

The Problem of Moderation

By “moderation,” I mean the governance mechanisms that
structure participation in a community to facilitate cooperation
and prevent abuse. Part II will explain how moderation works;
this Part lays the foundation by describing the problems it
must solve. Section A supplies some basic definitions and details the motivations of community members; Section B describes the goals of good moderation; Section C explains why
moderation must confront not one, but two commons problems;

18

Examples will appear throughout the Article, but a good starting point
would be Adrian Chen’s work. See, e.g., Adrian Chen, The Laborers Who
Keep Dick Pics and Beheadings out of Your Facebook Feed, WIRED, Oct. 23,
2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation [http://perma.cc/
FJK6-B9SC].
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and Section D provides a typology of the abuses against which
moderation guards.
A.

Definitions

Our object of study is an online community.19 A community
can be as small as the handful of people on a private mailing
list or as large as the Internet itself. Communities can overlap,
as anyone on both Twitter and Facebook knows. Communities
can also nest: the comments section at Instapundit is a meaningful community, and so is the conservative blogosphere.
There is little point in being overly precise about any given
community’s boundaries, so long as we can identify three
things: the community’s members, the content they share with
each other, and the infrastructure they use to share it.20 The
Internet as a whole is both an agglomeration of numerous
communities and a sprawling, loosely knit community in its
own right. Its moderation includes both the moderation within
its constituent communities and moderation that cannot easily
be attributed to any of them. Thus, even though it is not particularly helpful to talk about Google as a community in its
own right,21 it and other search engines play an important role
in the overall moderation of the Web.22
Members can wear different hats: there are owners of the
infrastructure, moderators of the community, and authors and
readers of content. For example, on YouTube, Google owns the
infrastructure; video uploaders are authors; video viewers are
readers; and the moderators include everyone who clicks to flag
an inappropriate video,23 the algorithms that collate user re19

20

21

22

23

The defined terms that make up the vocabulary of moderation will be
written in bolded italics when they make their first appearances in the
Article.
These are virtual communities, defined by a shared virtual place rather
than by shared geography, meaning, or practice. See generally HOWARD
RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY (1993); Quinn Warnick, What We
Talk About When We Talk About Talking: Ethos at Work in an Online
Community (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Iowa State University), http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2480&context=etd
[http://perma.cc/P9JK-HY2P]; see also PREECE, supra note 15, at 10-17.
The problem is that there is not a close nexus between Google’s users, the
content it indexes, and the infrastructure in Google’s server farms. Most
of the websites whose content appears on Google are Google “users” only
in a very loose sense, and they bring their own server infrastructure to the
table. There is interesting moderation here, but “Google” is the wrong level of generality for identifying the community that the moderation affects.
See generally James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV.
868, 893-96 (2014) (discussing the role of search engines in organizing the
Internet).
See Alistair Barr & Lisa Fleisher, YouTube Enlists ‘Trusted Flaggers’ to
Police Videos, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/
03/17/youtube-enlists-trusted-flaggers-to-police-videos [http://perma.cc/Z6
HY-RYKU].
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ports, and the unlucky YouTube employees who manually review flagged videos.24 Owners occupy a privileged position because their control over infrastructure gives them unappealable control over the community’s software-based rules.25 This
control lets owners decide who can moderate and how. Moderators, in turn, shape the flow of content from authors to readers.
Of course, members can wear multiple hats. “NO SPOILERS!”
is both content and a gently chiding act of moderation.
Members have varied motivations.26 Authors want their
messages to be seen;27 readers with diverse tastes seek content
of interest to them.28 Moderators, like authors, want to promote
the spread of content they care about.29 All of them can derive
personal fulfillment and a sense of belonging from participation. On the other side of the ledger, these activities take time
and effort. And where money changes hands, members would
naturally prefer to be paid rather than to pay. YouTube is popular with video makers in part because it pays them a share of
advertising revenue rather than charging them to host their
videos.30
Because the same person could be an author, reader, moderator, and owner, these motivations interrelate. Thus, for example, users connect their computers to peer-to-peer networks
to download files they want, but in the process they make files
on their computers available to other users. 31 They are willing
to act as owners supplying infrastructure because of the value
they receive as readers receiving content. Similarly, participants on a discussion forum may shoulder some of the work of
24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

See Brad Stone, Policing the Web’s Lurid Precincts, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/technology/19screen.html [http:
//perma.cc/Y493-7VKF].
See James Grimmelmann, Anarchy, Status Updates, and Utopia, 35 PACE
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstrac
t_id=2358627 [http://perma.cc/4R29-AJC3] [hereinafter Grimmelmann,
Anarchy].
See generally FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 111-20 (describing various user motivations).
See, e.g., Using a Zip Code Puts You Under Military Rule According to
Supreme Court, YOUTUBE (June 5, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=6TEOyp1ERVc [https://perma.cc/JC3J-A8AZ].
See, e.g., [Search Results for] ASMR, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/
results?search_query=ASMR (last visited Mar. 19 2015) [https://perma.cc
/9X65-RX5Y].
See, e.g., What Does It Mean to "Like" Something?, FACEBOOK, https://www
.facebook.com/help/110920455663362 [https://perma.cc/FRY7-H27R] (“Clicking Like below a post on Facebook is an easy way to let people know
that you enjoy it.”) .
See, e.g., What is the YouTube Partner Program?, YOUTUBE, https://suppo
rt.google.com/youtube/answer/72851 [https://perma.cc/3KCZ-QWHW].
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the
Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV.
505 (2003).
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moderation by flagging unwanted posts for deletion because
they enjoy being part of a thriving community. Divergent motivations become important only when there is a clear separation
of roles (e.g., paid professional moderators) or when a community is torn between participants with incompatible goals (e.g.,
amateur and professional photographers).
B.

Goals

From these individual motivations, we can derive goals for
moderation overall. Broadly speaking, moderation has three
goals. First, a well-moderated community will be productive: it
will generate and distribute valuable information goods. Some
of these information goods are valuable in themselves (Welcome
to Night Vale fan fiction), others because they facilitate transactions (Freecycle listings), and others because they are part of
socially important systems (political discussions). Productivity
is the greatest common divisor of moderation goals, the one
that everyone can agree on. Members share in the gains from
productivity as authors and readers. Society gains, too, when
valuable information spreads beyond the community—a classic
example of a positive spillover.32
Second, moderation can increase access to online communities. Openness is partly about efficiency: more members can
make the community more productive. But openness also has
moral consequences: cutting people off from a community cuts
them off from the knowledge the community produces.33 Openness exists along a spectrum. A wiki usable by anyone on the
Internet is more open than a wiki open to anyone on a school’s
network, which is in turn more open than a password-protected
wiki open only to the graduate students of the geology department. An important aspect of openness is democracy—
participation in moderation and in setting moderation policy.
Again, part of the justification is instrumental: broad participation can help make moderation more effective.34 But it can also
be important in itself for members to have a voice in making
moderation decisions. Democratic moderation is online selfgovernance.35

32

33

34
35

See generally Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007).
See generally JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR OPEN
ACCESS TO RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP (2005).
See, e.g., KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 151-52.
See, e.g., David R. Johnson, David G. Post & Marc Rotenberg, Governing
Online Spaces: Virtual Representation, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 3, 2013),
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/03/facebook-governance-and-virtual-repre
sentation [http://perma.cc/9DTM-FJTP] (“[A]ll users have a right to participate in the processes through which the rules by which they will be
bound are made.”).
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Third, a well-moderated community will have low costs: it
will do its work while making as few demands as possible on
the infrastructure and on participants. Costs here include the
obvious computational ones—servers, hard drives, network
connections, electricity, etc.—but also include the work required of participants, such as flagging a post for removal, removing a flagged post, or appealing an incorrectly removed
post. Each individual decision may be small, but they add up
quickly. Yahoo saved one million dollars per year in customer
support costs by substantially automating its moderation system for Yahoo Answers.36
These virtues are incomparable. Different moderation techniques inevitably trade off among them. Excluding the heaviest
users, for example, hurts productivity and openness while also
reducing costs. Even productivity and cost, both efficiency concerns, have distributional components: two members may agree
that a burden is worth bearing but disagree on who should bear
it.
C.

Commons Problems

One tension in particular animates the entire problem of
moderation. Online communities have a commons problem.37 In
fact, they have two. On the one hand, they depend on shared
infrastructure with limited capacity. Hard drives don’t grow on
trees. Members must collectively limit their use of infrastructure to keep this common-pool resource from collapsing.38 On
the other hand, online communities trade in information that
can potentially be shared without limit, so members must collectively catalyze themselves into creating and sharing.39 Solv36
37

38

39

See FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 243-77.
This account draws heavily on James Grimmelmann, The Internet Is a
Semicommons, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2799 (2010) [hereinafter Grimmelmann, Semicommons], which provides a more extensive exposition and
literature review.
Id. at 2806-10 (reviewing literature). A conventional understanding of
commonly held resources, as captured in Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968), was that without external “mutual
coercion, mutually agreed upon,” id. at 1247, exhaustion through overuse
was inevitable. Commons theorists, led by Elinor Ostrom, showed that
under the right conditions a community of users could itself collectively
moderate its use of a commonly held resource. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1990).
Grimmelmann, Semicommons, supra note 37, at 2810-15 (reviewing literature). Again, a conventional account emphasized the need for external
restraints, such as intellectual property laws. See, e.g., WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 19-21 (2003) (providing a conventional account of intellectual property). Here, the counter-movement showed that some creative
communities could self-regulate effectively and also that the absence of
restraints could itself catalyze creativity. See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRIS
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ing both problems at once is particularly tricky because the
most natural way to protect infrastructure is to discourage intensive use by limiting access, while the most natural way to
promote the sharing of information is to encourage extensive
use by opening up access.40 Moderation is how online communities walk the tightrope between overuse and underuse.41
In previous work, I described the Internet as a semicommons—a resource that is owned and managed as private property at one level but as a commons at another, and in which
“both common and private uses are important and impact significantly on each other.”42 The semicommons concept captures
both the costs that authors and readers can impose on owners
through overuse and the ways that owners can inhibit contentsharing uses by leveraging control of the infrastructure.43 It
also directs attention to moderation techniques that allow productive coexistence.44 The emphasis there is on the Internet as
a whole, but the same problems—and similar solutions—recur
in smaller online communities.45
Brett Frischmann’s theory of infrastructure also cleanly describes online communities. Indeed, I have borrowed the term
because the fit is so precise.46 To Frischmann, an infrastructural resource satisfies three criteria:
(1) The resource may be consumed nonrivalrously for some appreciable range of demand.

40

41

42

43
44
45
46

SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION
(2012); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
See Yochai Benkler, Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of Open
Commons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499, 1505-06 (2013);
Grimmelmann, Semicommons, supra note 37, at 2815.
See Mayo Fuster Morell, Governance of Online Creation Communities for
the Building of Digital Commons, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS
281 (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2014) (linking information production, infrastructure use, and
community governance).
Grimmelmann, Semicommons, supra note 37, at 2816 (quoting Henry E.
Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 132 (2000)). But see Benkler, supra note 40, at 1522-23
(criticizing the application of semicommons theory).
Grimmelmann, Semicommons, supra note 37, at 2817.
Id. at 2816-18.
Id. at 2823-41 (giving case studies).
BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED
RESOURCES (2012). Another early and sophisticated treatment of the nexus
between tangible and intangible resources is Carol M. Rose, The Comedy
of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 768 (1986). For a recent literature review, see
Benkler, supra note 40.
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(2) Social demand for the resource is driven primarily by downstream productive activity
that requires the resource as an input.
(3) The resource may be used as an input into a
wide range of goods and services . . . .47
This account captures the congestible but renewable nature of
online infrastructure, the interdependence between infrastructure and content, and the diversity of content. Frischmann argues for managing infrastructure as a commons with nondiscriminatory access rules, subject to nondiscriminatory use restrictions for “securing the commons itself,”48 an embrace of
openness that recognizes the interplay of productivity and cost.
D.

Abuses

The interface between infrastructure and information is
vulnerable to some predictable forms of strategic behavior, including spam, harassment, and other famous pathologies of
online life. These are the abuses against which moderation
must guard. Moderation need not prevent them entirely—and
probably cannot without killing the commons—but it must
keep them within acceptable bounds, and without driving up
the costs of moderation itself to unacceptable levels.49 The
abuses fall into four broad categories: congestion, cacophony,
abuse, and manipulation.
The first pair of problems involves overuse. Each participant’s contribution of content makes demands both on the infrastructure and on other participants. At the infrastructure
level, overuse causes congestion, which makes it harder for any
information to get through and can cause the infrastructure to
stagger and fall.50 At the content level, overuse causes cacophony, which makes it harder for participants to find what they
want. In trademark terms, they must incur search costs to sort
through the information available to them.51 Both congestion
and cacophony are problems of prioritization: bad content
crowds out good, to the private benefit of the content’s promoters but at an overall cost to the community. The difference is
that in congestion, the resource constraint is the infrastructure’s capacity, whereas in cacophony, the constraint is partici47
48

49

50
51

FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at xiv.
Id. at 92; see also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two
Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S45455 (2002) (differentiating access and use restrictions as strategies for
managing resource use).
See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the
Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 132, 141-42 (2000).
See FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 136-58.
See James Grimmelmann, Information Policy for the Library of Babel, 3 J.
BUS. & TECH. L. 29 (2008).
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pants’ attention.52 Spam is the classic example of overuse causing both congestion and cacophony.53 A denial-of-service attack
is an attempt to create congestion for its own sake.
Next, there is abuse, in which the community generates
negative-value content—information “bads” rather than information goods.54 Abuse is distinctively a problem of information
exchange. The harms it causes are the harms information
causes as speech that is understood and acted on by humans.
Harassment is the classic example of abuse directed at particular people, while trolling is the classic example of abuse directed at the community in general.55 In its extreme form,
abuse involves an entire community uniting to share content in
a way that harms the rest of society, such as trading copyrighted movies pre-release, planning the assassination of doctors
who perform abortions, or starting offensive hoaxes.56
Finally, there is manipulation, in which ideologically motivated participants try to skew the information available
through the community.57 A forum moderator on a science discussion site who deletes posts from climate scientists while
leaving posts from climate change deniers is engaging in manipulation, as is a retailer that games its way to the top of
search rankings with link farms and hidden text. The classic
pathological case of manipulation is the edit war, in which wiki
52

53

54

55

56

57

For an early explanation of this distinction in terms of “exploitation” and
“pollution,” see Gian Maria Greco & Luciano Floridi, The Tragedy of the
Digital Commons, 6 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 73, 76 (2004).
This general definition of overuse emphasizes that spam is a problem
hardly confined to email. See Grimmelmann, Semicommons, supra note
37, at 2839 (“[A]ny sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable
from a spam vector.”); see generally FINN BRUNTON, SPAM: A SHADOW HISTORY OF THE INTERNET (2013) (cataloging other forms of spam).
See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and
Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91
B.U. L. REV. 1435 (2011).
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472,
1493-97 (2007). A troll “posts deliberately erroneous or antagonistic messages to a newsgroup or similar forum with the intention of eliciting a
hostile or corrective response,” Troll, n.1, OXFORD ENG. DICT. (Draft additions Mar. 2006), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/206613 [http://perma.cc
/4AHN-P3ZL], often with “willful, disingenuous provocation and malicious
deceit.” David Auerbach, Anonymity as Culture: Treatise, TRIPLE CANOPY,
http://canopycanopycanopy.com/contents/anonymity_as_culture__treatise
[http://perma.cc/3UNF-SJE4].
See, e.g., Caitlin Dewey, 4Chan’s Latest, Terrible Prank: Convincing West
Africans that Ebola Doctors Actually Worship the Disease, WASH. POST,
Sept. 22, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/20
14/09/22/4chans-latest-terrible-prank-convincing-west-africans-that-eboladoctors-actually-worship-the-disease [http://perma.cc/2WUX-DBFJ].
See Christopher E. Peterson, User-Generated Censorship: Manipulating
the Maps of Social Media (2013) (unpublished M.S. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), http://cmsw.mit.edu/user-generatedcensorship [http://perma.cc/8TJN-2CVB].
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users with conflicting ideologies engage in a wasteful conflict to
make a page reflect their point of view. Like abuse, manipulation is distinctively a problem of information exchange: it is
possible whenever some information can be deleted entirely, or
when participants can exploit each other’s cognitive limits. The
difference is that, in abuse, the content itself is the problem,
while in manipulation, worthwhile content is handled in a way
that harms the community. The dueling pro- and anti-war edits
to the Los Angeles Times wikitorial were manipulation; the
pornography that followed was abuse.
II.

The Grammar of Moderation

Now that we have seen the problems that moderation faces,
we can discuss how it solves them. We have already met the
basic definitions: a community of members who use shared infrastructure to exchange content. The members have roles: as
owners of infrastructure, as authors and readers of content, and
as moderators. These are the nouns in the grammar of moderation.
Section A of this Part describes the verbs—the four principal techniques of moderation. Two are relatively simple. Exclusion keeps unwanted members out of the community entirely;
pricing uses market forces to allocate participation. The other
two are more complex. In organization, moderators reshape
the flow of content from authors to readers; in norm-setting,
they inculcate community-serving values in other members.
Together, these are the basic tools of moderation.
Section B considers some important distinctions in how
moderation is carried out. Each of these distinctions can be applied to any of the moderation techniques to give it different
inflections. If the techniques are verbs, these distinctions are
the adverbs. First, moderation can be carried out manually, by
human moderators making individualized decisions in specific
cases, or automatically, by algorithms making uniform decisions in every case matching a specified pattern. Second, moderation can be done transparently, with each decision and its
reasoning available for public review, or opaquely, behind the
electronic equivalent of closed doors. Third, there is the familiar distinction between regulation ex ante and regulation ex
post—deterrence versus punishment, protection versus repair.
And fourth, moderation can be centralized and carried out by
one powerful moderator making global decisions, or decentralized and carried out by many dispersed moderators making local decisions.
Section C then examines some underlying community characteristics that can significantly influence the success or failure
of the different moderation techniques. These are adjectives:
they modify the nouns (especially “community”) in the gram-
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mar of moderation. Sometimes they are set by the community
at large, while at other times they are under the control of
moderators or regulators. First, there is the capacity of the infrastructure. Greater capacity comes at a higher cost but is less
prone to congestion. Second, there is the size of the community.
Larger communities can engage in broader sharing but are less
cohesive. Third, ownership of the infrastructure may be more
or less concentrated, which affects the distribution of power
among members and hence their influence over moderation decisions. Fourth, members may be more or less identified within
the community: rich identities enhance trust and cooperation
but can also be a barrier to participation.
This is a rich, complicated taxonomy. Its subtleties are not
to be grasped on this first, abbreviated glance. This is just the
map, the outline whose broad contours we will now fill in.
A.

Techniques (Verbs)

The real study of moderation begins with the verbs of moderation—the basic actions that moderators can take to affect
the dynamics of a community. There are four: excluding, pricing, organizing, and norm-setting.58
1.

Excluding

Exclusion is fundamental in property theory because of its
simplicity.59 Rather than attempt to calibrate specific uses, one
simply excludes outsiders from all uses.60 In an online community, exclusion deprives the community of the contributions
that those who are excluded could have made. But that loss can
be justified when exclusion inhibits strategic behavior. It can
be used against any form of strategic behavior by targeting
those users who engage in that behavior—for example, to reduce congestion by excluding known spammers.
The processes used to decide who will be excluded can fall
anywhere along the spectrum from highly precise to absurdly
crude. Mark Lemley individually vets each subscriber to the
CyberProfs mailing list; for a time, Facebook was available only

58

59

60

The account given here draws on several strands of legal theory. Foremost
among them is Lessig’s theory of four modalities of regulation: law, norms,
markets, and architecture. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:
What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507-11 (1999); James
Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719 (2005).
Other strands include property theory and commons theory.
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730 (1998).
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 48. Exclusion is therefore an architectural
constraint in Lessig’s four-modalities taxonomy. Lessig, supra note 58. It
acts automatically and immediately to prevent non-members from participating. Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, supra note 58, at 1723.
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to users with a .edu email address.61 At any level of precision, a
particularly important decision is whether the default is inclusion or exclusion. A default of inclusion gives everyone, wellintentioned or not, at least one bite at the apple.62 Exclusion
can also be applied independently to different roles. It is common, for example, to let anyone read a discussion board but to
allow only registered users to post.63
2.

Pricing

Pricing inhibits participation, both good and bad, by raising
its costs.64 Pricing is more information intensive than exclusion
because one must set the level of prices.65 Some prices are explicit, such as World of Warcraft’s $14.99 per month subscription fee. Other prices are implicit: Twitter’s abuse-reporting
process is long and involved, so anyone who wants to report
abuse must pay with their time.66 Advertising is a prevalent
form of implicit pricing: readers pay with their time and attention.
Any of the different roles can be priced separately. Authorship is the obvious target to be priced first because of its bandwidth demands.67 Pricing can be applied at many levels of
granularity, from flat-rate all-access passes to microtransactions for each action. At one extreme, prohibitively high prices
collapse into de facto exclusion. At the other extreme, free is a
price, too—one that sends a broadly welcoming signal to potential members.68 Prices can even be negative, in which case they

61

62

63

64
65
66

67

68

See Janet Kornblum, Facebook Will Soon Be Available to Everyone, USA
TODAY, Sept. 11, 2006, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-0911-facebook-everyone_x.htm [http://perma.cc/5CVL-WYKA].
For an example of why an inward-looking community might nonetheless
choose inclusion by default, see Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and
“Blurry-Edged” Social Networks, 50 B.U. L. REV. 1315 (2009).
See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, METAFILTER, http://faq.metafilter.co
m/#38 [http://perma.cc/7ZJ4-S9GE].
See Lessig, supra note 58, at 507-08.
See Smith, supra note 48, at S471-72.
See Mary Anne Franks, The Many Ways Twitter Is Bad at Responding to
Abuse, THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 14, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/technolog
y/archive/2014/08/the-many-ways-twitter-is-bad-at-responding-to-abuse/3
76100 [http://perma.cc/X8EN-ADQM]. On implicit prices, see generally
PREECE, supra note 15, at 133-43 (discussing usability factors in online
communities).
Flickr, for example, offers unlimited access for viewing photos, requires a
free account to post up to 1TB of photos, and sells a second TB of storage
for $499 a year. The three bands consist of no price, an implicit price, and
an explicit price. Overall, authorship is priced higher than readership. See
Free Accounts, Upgrading and Gifts, FLICKR, https://www.flickr.com/help/
limits [https://perma.cc/N9NN-BBW6].
See generally CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: THE FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE
(2009).
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provide a subsidy. For example, when it launched, Epinions
paid users to write reviews.69
As taxes on participation, prices have two basic purposes.
One is to raise revenue for the community’s use, typically by
charging authors and readers to compensate owners (for supplying infrastructure) and professional moderators (for their
work). The other is Pigouvian—to make members internalize
some of the costs of their behavior.70 Pricing is naturally wellsuited to account for congestion.71 A per-message email fee, for
example, would reduce spam by forcing senders to account for
some of the resources spam sucks up.72 This type of pricing can
also induce participants to signal their quality, ideally deterring those who have little to offer the community.73 A $5, onetime registration fee, small as it is, can provide a substantial
deterrent to casual malcontents.74
3.

Organizing

Organization shapes the flow of content from authors to
readers.75 It is the verb of moderation that most takes advantage of the informational capabilities of computers.76 Categorizing messages on a bulletin board by topic is organization.
So is searching them by keyword, counting the number of messages, or deleting off-topic messages. These are all ways of remixing authors’ contributions to give readers a more satisfying
experience.
It is helpful to think of organizing techniques as being built
up from several basic operations:

69

70
71
72

73
74

75

76

See Eric Goldman, Epinions, The Path-Breaking Website, Is Dead. Some
Lessons It Taught Us, FORBES, Mar. 12, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
ericgoldman/2014/03/12/epinions-the-path-breaking-website-is-dead-somelessons-it-taught-us [http://perma.cc/M57J-RUVA]. Paying authors and
moderators can backfire to the extent that payments crowd out other motivations. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 96-97 (2006).
See KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 157-58.
See FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 146-49.
See, e.g., Cynthia Dwork & Moni Naor, Pricing via Processing or Combatting Junk Mail, in ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY—CRYPTO ’92 139 (1993)
(implementing pricing by requiring “sender to compute some moderately
expensive, but not intractable, function”).
See FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 148.
KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 200; rusty [Rusty Foster], K5 Becomes
“Gated Dysfunctional Community”, KURO5HIN (Sept. 10, 2007), http://www
.kuro5hin.org/story/2007/9/10/13920/3664 [http://perma.cc/X27E-BUUT].
In Lessig’s taxonomy, organization is another application of architecture.
Lessig, supra note 58, at 508-09.
For a thoughtful catalog of organizational interface patterns, see generally
TIDWELL, supra note 16, especially chapters 3, 4, 5, and 7.
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• Deletion is the removal of content. A bulletin board
administrator who excises off-topic and profanity-laden
posts is engaged in deletion.77
• Editing is the alteration of content. It ranges from
correcting typos to changing the very essence of a post.
At the limit, editing is deletion plus authorship: the
moderator rejects an author’s reality and substitutes
her own.
• Annotation is the addition of information about content.78 eBay’s feedback system annotates buyers and
sellers; Facebook’s Likes annotate posts and comments;
Amazon’s user-written reviews and lists are annotations
that have crossed the line and become content in their
own right.
• Synthesis is the transformative combination of pieces of content. Wikipedia is the ultimate example of synthesis. There, small and heterogeneous changes by individual users are synthesized into entire encyclopedia
entries. On a smaller scale, an online poll synthesizes
individual votes into totals.
• Filtering is deletion’s non-destructive cousin: the
content is still there, but readers see a specialized subset of it. A search engine filters; so does a blog’s list of
the ten most recent comments. At the limit, filtering asymptotically approaches deletion: the ten-thousandth
search result might as well not exist.
• Formatting is the styling of of content for presentation to readers. Good typography improves readability;
sensible ordering and grouping of images makes it possible to scan through them quickly.
Like the other verbs, organization is itself costly but can reduce strategic behavior. Organization directly attacks cacophony by helping readers see only the content they want. At the
77

78

Ephemerality is a species of deletion. Snapchat photos vanish within seconds to provide privacy and engagement. See danah boyd, Why Snapchat
Is Valuable: It’s All About Attention, APOPHENIA, Mar. 21, 2014,
http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2014/03/21/snapchat-attention
.html [http://perma.cc/YA2Y-FLKF] (“The underlying message is simple:
You’ve got 7 seconds. PAY ATTENTION. And when people do choose to
open a Snap, they actually stop what they’re doing and look.”). But see
Snapchat, Inc., F.T.C. 132 3078 (Dec. 31, 2014) (alleging a failure by
Snapchat to secure privacy of photos). Ephemerality can be destructive of
community. As Sarah Jeong says of Twitter, “Mix ephemerality, disconnectedness, and stable identities, and you get ever-lasting grudges filtered
through a game of Telephone.” @sarahjeong, TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2014),
https://twitter.com/sarahjeong/status/519990219043389440 [https://perma
.cc/8F8N-U9FE].
See FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 39-65, 131-61 (providing a rich
taxonomy of annotation systems).
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same time, organization indirectly reduces cacophony by reducing the incentives for authors to create low-value content that
readers don’t want and will never see.79 Only deletion directly
attacks congestion, but all forms of organization have the same
indirect effect of reducing the incentive to spam.80 On the other
hand, organization can be a tool for manipulation in the hands
of self-interested moderators. Think, for example, of a Judean
People’s Front sympathizer deleting every mention of the People’s Front of Judea on a Roman forum.81 Finally, depending on
how it is used, organization can either greatly amplify or greatly inhibit abuse: compare a gossip site that deletes crude sexual
comments with one that invites them.
The real complexity of organization comes when one uses
multiple types of organization at once. An email list moderator
who deletes some posts and marks others as “important” is
simultaneously filtering and annotating. A user who flags an
Amazon review as helpful is annotating it. Amazon then synthesizes the flags into totals and filters users’ views based on
those totals.82 Wikipedia’s Talk pages are annotation applied to
the synthesis process.83 Slashdot’s moderation provides an annotative input into filtration (readers can choose to see only
highly rated comments), in the process making the annotations
themselves the subject of “meta-moderation.”84
Finally, of course, organization interacts with the other
verbs. Reddit gives its paid Gold users better filtering tools
than regular users.85 In many communities, those who are
flagged by other participants for poor contributions may be
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80

81
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85

Filtration hides unwanted content; deletion removes it outright; annotation enables readers to evaluate the content’s relevance to them without
actually reading it; and synthesis turns several moderate-value contributions into one higher-value one.
On the other hand, readers facing lower search costs will increase their
consumption, both encouraging them to greater creation of their own and
also raising the incentives for authors to contribute. Thus, since organization can increase contribution through one mechanism and deter it
through another, the overall impact of effective organization on infrastructure owners’ private costs is indeterminate.
See Monty Python’s Life of Brian (HandMade Films 1979).
For a detailed visual grammar for describing these multi-stage systems of
organization, see FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16.
See DARIUSZ JEMIELNIAK, COMMON KNOWLEDGE? AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WIKIPEDIA (2014).
See Clifford A. Lampe, Ratings Use in an Online Discussion System: The
Slashdot Case (2006) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan), http://
deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/39369/lampe_diss_revis
ed.pdf [http://perma.cc/BN9G-REAK].
See Reddit Gold, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/gold/about [http://perma.c
c/2X5J-QZU9].

2015

The Virtues of Moderation

61

banned—resulting in exclusion based on annotation based on
social norms.86
4.

Norm-Setting

Moderation’s biggest challenge and most important mission
is to create strong shared norms among participants. Norms
can target every form of strategic behavior. For example, if every author refrains from personal attacks, there is no further
personal-attack problem to be solved. Beneficial norms, however, cannot simply be set by fiat. By definition, they are an
emergent property of social interactions. Moderators have limited power over group norms. Most of the levers they can pull
will only nudge norms in one direction or another, possibly unpredictably. Good norm-setting is a classic example of knowhow. There are heuristics, but knowing whether to chastise an
uncivil user publicly or privately is not a decision that can be
made in the abstract.87 Blogger Jason Kottke summed up the
challenges of norm-setting with characteristic verve:
Punishing the offenders and erasing the graffiti
is the easy part . . . [F]ostering “a culture that
encourages both personal expression and constructive conversation” is much more difficult.
Really fucking hard, in fact . . . it requires nearconstant vigilance. If I opened up comments on
everything on kottke.org, I could easily employ
someone for 8-10 hours per week to keep things
clean, facilitate constructive conversation, coaxing troublemakers into becoming productive
members of the community, etc. Both MetaFilter
and Flickr have dedicated staff to perform such
duties . . . I imagine other community sites do as
well. If you've been ignoring all of the uncivility
on your site for the past 2 years, it's going to be
difficult to clean it up. The social patterns of your
community’s participants, once set down, are difficult to modify in a significant way.88
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See Kate Crawford & Tarleton Gillespie, What Is a Flag for? Social Media
Reporting Tools and the Vocabulary of Complaint, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y
(2014).
See, e.g., NG, supra note 15, at 77-83, 94-97; Warnick, supra note 20, at
113 (“[A] strong collective ethos—generated by individuals but bigger than
any one person—is essential to maintaining a successful online community.”).
Jason Kottke, The Blogger Code, KOTTKE.ORG (Apr. 9, 2007), http://kottke
.org/07/04/the-blogger-code [http://perma.cc/H9US-3V6N ].
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Some communities depend on shared norms. Discussion
groups, for example, are acutely sensitive to group norms. It
only takes a few determined spammers or trolls to bring a discussion to a screeching halt.89 But other communities can prosper even when some norms are widely flouted. Spammers and
trolls still abound on the Internet, but they have not yet managed to ruin it for everyone. Google may not be able to make
spammers clean up their act, but it can hide their antics.90 The
difference illustrates the two roles that the other verbs of moderation can play. Sometimes, they keep order directly, in the
face of bad behavior; at other times, they keep order indirectly,
by encouraging good behavior. That is, the other three verbs
are both substitutes for and sources of norms, and communities
vary in the balance they strike between these two roles.
Moderators can influence norms directly by articulating
them. They can do this either in general, with codes of conduct
and other broad statements of rules, or in specific cases by
praising good behavior and criticizing bad. The difference is the
difference between “Don’t post images containing nudity” and
“This post has been deleted because it contained nudity.” Note,
however, that stating a norm does not automatically promote
it. There is empirical evidence that, in some circumstances, expressing a norm about user behavior can induce exactly the opposite response.91
Moderators can also influence norms indirectly, through the
other verbs.92 A list of “new and noteworthy posts” doesn’t just
help users find good posts through organization, it also educates them in what makes a post good in the first place. Put
another way, moderators can use the other three verbs not just
to regulate but also to nudge. The flip side of this point, though,
is that any time a moderator uses one of the other verbs, she
89
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See Grimmelmann, Semicommons, supra note 37, at 2834-39 (discussing
vulnerability of Usenet discussion groups in face of breakdown of shared
norms).
See GOOGLE, Fighting Spam, http://www.google.com/insidesearch/howsear
chworks/fighting-spam.html [http://perma.cc/8LDU-CTGK]. For an example of the controversies that search engine anti-spam efforts can generate,
see Josh Constine, Google Destroys Rap Genius’ Search Rankings As Punishment For SEO Spam, But Resolution in Progress, TECHCRUNCH, Dec.
25, 2013, http://techcrunch.com/2013/12/25/google-rap-genius [http://perm
a.cc/M465-5SYJ].
See, e.g., Justin Cheng et al., How Community Feedback Shapes User Behavior, PROC. INT’L CONF. WEBLOGS & SOCIAL MEDIA (2014), http://cs.stanfo
rd.edu/people/jure/pubs/disqus-icwsm14.pdf [http://perma.cc/9WW3-A9CH]
(“Instead, we find that community feedback is likely to perpetuate undesired behavior. In particular, punished authors actually write worse in
subsequent posts, while rewarded authors do not improve significantly.”).
The other verbs of moderation are, in this sense, secondary to normsetting. Either they encourage users to comply with community norms, or
they step in when norms have failed.
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nudges participants’ norms, whether she intends to or not. For
example, excluding a well-known commenter can reduce participants’ sense of trust in a moderator, even if the exclusion is
justified. Experienced moderators evaluate every design decision in terms of its effects on community norms.
A few particularly important ways to promote good norms
reflect the accumulated wisdom of community managers. By
far the most significant is fostering a sense of shared identity
that reinforces participants’ sense of belonging and their commitment to the good of the community.93 Another is the initiation of new participants, who must be taught the community’s
expectations at the same time as they are made to feel welcome.94 Highlighting good behavior and hiding bad behavior
reinforce participants’ sense that good behavior is prevalent
while also teaching them what to do.95 As a result, designers
frequently worry about how to balance competitive and cooperative impulses. Competition can spur users to individual effort
at the cost of social cohesion, and different communities strike
the balance differently.96
B.

Distinctions (Adverbs)

Picking a verb of moderation does not end the process. Each
verb can be used in quite different ways. There are four important distinctions that affect how a type of moderation operates: (1) humans vs. computers, (2) secret vs. transparent, (3)
ex ante vs. ex post, and (4) centralized vs. decentralized. These
are the “adverbs” of moderation. These four distinctions are independent: any Verb of moderation can be applied using any of
the sixteen possible combinations. For example, spam filters
are a secret, decentralized, automatic, ex post form of organization (specifically, deletion). A chat room facilitator is a centralized, human, transparent norm-setter who acts both ex ante
and ex post and may have access to tools for exclusion and deletion.
1.

Automatically / Manually

Moderation decisions can be made automatically by software or manually by people.97 To take a simple example, a poli93
94
95
96
97

See, e.g., KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 79-115.
See, e.g., NG, supra note 15, at 179-92.
See, e.g., KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 140-150.
See, e.g., CRUMLISH & MALONE, supra note 16, at 155-59.
In a narrow sense, all moderation decisions are applied by software because an online community is entirely a creature of software. Grimmelmann, Anarchy, supra note 25. And in a broad sense, all policy decisions
are ultimately made by the people who control and program the software.
Id. We are concerned here with the intermediate question of which actor
is responsible for day-to-day, garden-variety moderation decisions. The
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cy against foul language could be implemented either through
a software filter that blocks the seven dirty words or by a censor who reads everything and decides what does and does not
cross the line.98 Humans have been setting norms, excluding,
pricing, and organizing for millennia. Software, too, can do all
four, albeit with varying aptitude. Software is effective at enforcing some exclusion decisions. Geotargeting, for example,
limits access based on physical location.99 On the other hand,
some exclusion criteria remain easier to apply manually. Whisper employs a small army of moderators in the Philippines to
screen images for “pornography, gore, minors, sexual solicitation, sexual body parts/images, [and] racism.”100 Software is
even more effective at pricing. Offering standardized price
terms to anyone in the world is the kind of low-granularity but
universal application for which it is comparatively easy to write
software.101 Improved machine learning and data-mining technologies have led to stunning advances in software-abetted organization in the last decade, particularly in search (a hybrid of
synthesis and filtration).102 Software is least good at normsetting, due to its lack of understanding of human subtleties,
but it can still participate. Design features signal attitudes, can
elicit empathetic reactions from participants, can mimic normaffecting participation, and can shape what other participants
see.103
Three characteristics of software I identified in Regulation
by Software play out predictably when software is used for
moderation.104 First, software moderation has higher fixed
costs but much lower marginal costs than human moderation.
It takes more work to tell a computer what to do than to tell a
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101

102
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choice is whether humans themselves make specific decisions about particular content or whether they delegate those decisions to algorithms.
But see Declan McCullagh, Google’s Chastity Belt Too Tight, CNET NEWS,
Apr. 23, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1032_3-5198125.html [http://per
ma.cc/HM8L-ZWXA] (describing the “Scunthorpe problem” of overzealous
software filters that find false positives of prohibited terms embedded in
innocent phrases).
See generally Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 567 (2012).
See Chen, supra note 18.
See generally Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
629 (2012); Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, supra note 58, at
1746-49.
See generally Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, supra note 22; see also R.
Stuart Geiger, The Lives of Bots, in CRITICAL POINT OF VIEW: A WIKIPEDIA
READER 78-93 (Geert Lovink & Nathaniel Tkacz eds., 2011) (describing
the use of bots on Wikipedia for mass organization).
See, e.g., Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy
and Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809 (2010); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Digital Architecture as Crime Control, 112 YALE L.J. 2261 (2003).
Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, supra note 58.
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human, but once the programming work is done, it is cheap to
use it in thousands or millions of cases.105 No human could possibly carry out the millions of sorting decisions Reddit makes
on a daily basis. Software is also more rule-bound than humans
are. Thus, software is comparatively more effective at making
decisions that can be reduced to “hard” facts and figures, such
as how many messages a user has sent or how widely a given
message has been distributed.106 And third, software fails differently than humans: it can fail all at once and is vulnerable
to hacking. This is not to say that software is always less reliable or secure—humans make inexplicable errors and are vulnerable to social manipulation. But most of the time, human
decision-making is more robust than software decision making.107
The tradeoff between cost and quality is characteristic of
the choice between human and automated moderation. More
human attention generally means better but costlier decisions.
One of the reasons that user-generated moderation is so attractive to Internet companies is that it allows for human moderation’s greater responsiveness while pushing the associated
costs off onto users. Companies are also now increasingly using
outsourced labor to drive down the cost of human review.108
Paradoxically, by turning human moderation into assemblyline piecework, these companies make it more and more like
automated moderation—cheap, but also rule-bound and inflexible.
2.

Transparently / Secretly

Every moderation decision has some observable consequences, but some are more observable than others. Transparent moderation makes explicit and public what the moderators
have done and why, revealing what the overall moderation policies are and how they apply in each specific case. Secret moderation hides the details. This distinction is really a spectrum:
moderation could be transparent about the what but not the
why, or transparent only some of the time. Generally speaking,
transparency takes additional work to implement, just as having judges give reasoned explanations of their decisions increases the judicial workload.

105
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Id. at 1729.
Id. at 1732-34.
Id. at 1742-45.
See Chen, supra note 18; see also Tarleton Gillespie, The Dirty Job of
Keeping Facebook Clean, CULTURE DIGITALLY, Feb. 22, 2012, http://culture
digitally.org/2012/02/the-dirty-job-of-keeping-facebook-clean [http://perma
.cc/A4ED-B3G8] (discussing Facebook’s detailed guidelines for outsourced
moderators).
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It is easier to be secretive about some kinds of moderation
than others. Someone who is excluded from a community will
generally be able to tell that they are being denied access, although it is sometimes possible to disguise the fact that it is deliberate.109 Prices, for the most part, also need to be known to
be effective in shaping choices, although implicit prices and micropayments can create some wiggle room.110 Organization has
the most room for secrecy. Search users don’t know what pages
Google hides from them; Facebook users may not realize that
the News Feed is only a partial list of posts from friends.111
Conversely, secret norms are close to an oxymoron: norms must
be known to be effective.
The choice between transparency and secrecy in exclusion,
pricing, and organization can have indirect effects on norms.
On the one hand, transparency enhances legitimacy, providing
community support for moderation, while secrecy raises fears
of censorship and oppression.112 On the other, the “Streisand
Effect” can undermine the effectiveness of exclusion or deletion:
censorship attempts call attention to the censored material.113
Indeed, censorship can undermine norms by suggesting that
the unwanted behavior is prevalent and can even draw trolls
seeking attention.114 One clever technique for splitting the difference is disemvoweling—leaving only the consonants in an
inappropriate comment.115
The choice between secrecy and transparency also interacts
with the choice between software and humans. The more com109
110

111

112
113

114
115

See, e.g., KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 137-38.
“Micropayments are systems that make it easy to pay small amounts of
money.” Michael Kinsley, You Can't Sell News by the Slice, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2009, at A27. See generally Clay Shirky, The Case Against Micropayments, O'REILLY P2P (Dec. 19, 2000), http://www.openp2p.com/pub/a/p
2p/2000/12/19/micropayments.html [http://perma.cc/ZU9F-JK7F] (critizing
micropayment systems).
See J. Nathan Matias, Uncovering Algorithms: Looking Inside the Facebook News Feed, MIT CTR. FOR CIVIC MEDIA (July 22, 2014), https://civic.m
it.edu/blog/natematias/uncovering-algorithms-looking-inside-the-facebooknews-feed [https://perma.cc/9GUD-87YT].
See KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 138; NG, supra note 15, at 104-07.
The canonical example of the Streisand effect is the trope namer: Barbra
Streisand’s failed attempt to suppress distribution of an aerial photograph
of her house, which led hundreds of thousands of people to seek out the
photograph. See Paul Rogers, Streisand’s Home Becomes Hit on Web, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 24, 2003, http://www.californiacoastline.org/ne
ws/sjmerc5.html [http://perma.cc/4JE4-VUSR].
See KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 145.
See Cory Doctorow, How to Keep Hostile Jerks from Taking over Your
Online Community, INFORMATION WEEK (May 14, 2007), http://www.infor
mationweek.com/how-to-keep-hostile-jerks-from-taking-over-your-onlinecommunity/d/d-id/1055100 [http://perma.cc/7ZS5-DWCS] (arguing that
disemvoweling “takes the sting out of” abusive comments without censoring them, and also signals community norms).
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plex an algorithm, the harder to explain why it does what it
does in a way that is intelligible to humans and the greater the
risk that it will act unaccountably.116 Yet secrecy may be necessary: transparency is riskier with software than with people
because there is a danger of unchecked loopholes.117 Anti-spam
email filtering, for example, depends in part for its success on
the fact that spammers are unaware of the exact details of filtering and so cannot send messages guaranteed to sneak past
filters. The costs of secrecy do not just fall on abusive users,
though. Google’s secretive ways, adopted as a defense against
search engine optimizers, make it hard for innocent websites to
understand why their search rankings have fallen.
3.

Ex Ante / Ex Post

Moderators can act ex ante—using their power over the infrastructure to allow some actions and prohibit others—or they
can act ex post—using their powers to punish evildoers and set
right that which has gone wrong. Acting ex ante takes advantage of software’s architectural features; acting ex post is a
more traditionally law-like technique.118 Ex ante moderation
can produce consistency by applying the same rules to all content. Ex post moderation can conserve resources by directing
moderators’ attention only where it is needed.
The distinction plays out differently for different verbs. Ex
ante exclusion can work in three ways. First, it can ration access to limit congestion and cacophony. A chat room with ten
participants is easier to follow than one with a hundred all going full-speed.119 Second, it can be a crude filter that uses a
member’s identity as a proxy for the value of her contributions:
a company might reasonably assume that non-employees have
little to add to the discussion on its legal department’s email
list.120 Finally, it can limit community size: smaller communities may eo ipso be better able to cooperate because they have
stronger norms.121 Ex post exclusion is a punishment for mis116
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See Matias, supra note 111 (“Is there any person at Facebook who knows
how the algorithm works?”); see generally Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2007).
See FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 91-93.
See Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, supra note 58, at 1729-30.
The distinction has been regularly rediscovered. See, e.g., Michael L. Rich,
Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 795
(2013); Danny Rosenthal, Assessing Digital Preemption (and the Future of
Law Enforcement?), 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 576 (2011).
See FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 144-46.
PREECE, supra note 15, at 273 (discussing special-purpose communities
that limit registration); Smith, supra note 48, at S468-71 (discussing exclusion as a crude filter).
See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (rev. ed.
1971).
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behavior that puts teeth in community rules.122 If ex post exclusion is coupled with some transparency about the reasons for
excluding participants, its existence gives members an incentive to behave.123
Ex ante pricing implements the usual understanding of a
market—pay to play. Ex post pricing could be one of three
things. First, the moderators may simply be extending credit to
members or offering a free trial: those who do not pay up when
billed will then be excluded. Second, it could be an honorsystem—pricing backed up by norms—in which participants
who appreciate content or the community are encouraged to
chip in to support it.124 Third, an ex post price could be a sanction for misbehavior, a punishment short of exclusion.125
The choice between ex ante and ex post organization is tied
to the choice of actor and thus to the incidence of implicit costs.
Authors act ex ante; readers act ex post; moderators can do either. If authors must pick ex ante a topic on a discussion board
in which to post, the cost of posting is higher by the amount of
effort involved in picking the right one. If moderators come
along ex post and assign topics, authors bear less of a burden,
and moderators bear more of one. Ex post organization is widespread, as everyone who has ever liked a photo on Facebook or
flagged an abusive YouTube comment can confirm.
Regardless of who performs it, ex ante organization imposes
a time cost on distribution because readers do not receive content until it has been organized. It may be more convenient to
get your email from a mailing list in a daily digest, but you will
miss out on fast-breaking conversations. Ex post organization
can be faster-moving,126 but if the goal is to edit out unwanted
content and to inculcate norms against it, leaving it in place for
too long can be dangerous.127 Further, because ex post organiza122
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See KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 158-60; NG, supra note 15, at 97.
For example, MetaFilter bans users who use posts for self-promotion. See
Self Link, MEFI WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/Self_Link [http://perma.cc/
V9GW-N7M4]. Note that this point holds only when users have enough
invested in their community identities to make exclusion a meaningful
sanction.
But see Matthew Ingram, Why Online “Tip Jar”-Style Payment Systems
Don’t Work, GIGAOM, May 11, 2011, http://gigaom.com/2011/05/11/why-onl
ine-tip-jar-style-payment-systems-dont-work [http://perma.cc/APR9-M4U
9].
See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).
The difference between sanctions and prices is that sanctions attempt to
defend a known line from transgression, rather than to measure the precise amount of harm. The temporal asymmetry provides a different way to
distinguish sanctions and prices. Prices can be applied ex ante or ex post,
but sanctions can only be applied ex post.
See BELL, supra note 16, at 59 (praising The Guardian for its use of ex
post moderation).
See KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 132.
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tion can alter content or change its attributes, it can paradoxically impose search costs on participants. If you have ever
found a web page through a search engine, only to lose it later
when the page is no longer a prominent result for your original
search term, you are a victim of a change in ex post filtration.
An especially important aspect of ex post organization—
specifically of ex post deletion—is the spectrum from ephemerality to permanence.128 By lowering the stakes, ephemerality
promotes experimentation, risk-taking, and contingency.129 It
also inhibits the formation of recognizable individual identities,
which can ironically promote the development of a shared collective ethos.130 More persistent content allows for normenhancing community memory and for enduring individual
reputations. The good that community members do lives on; so
does the bad.
Finally, effective social norms have both ex ante and ex post
aspects. Ex post, the community expresses its approval or disapproval after a member has acted. Once someone has hit reply-all for a personal aside, others can only glower and make
pointed remarks. Ex ante social norms are those that members
have internalized. With enough pointed remarks, members will
learn to check themselves before they hit reply-all.
4.

Centrally / Distributedly

Moderation decisions can be made either centrally by a single moderator whose decision affects the entire community, or
by multiple distributed moderators whose individual decisions
affect only part of the community.131 For the most part, the
consequences are as one would expect, and track the usual legal debates about hierarchy and federalism. Centralized moderation provides consistency: there is only one domain-name
system. Distributed moderation promotes diversity: TMZ and
PatientsLikeMe have different moderation policies, and should.
Centralized moderation aggregates information: Google’s PageRank algorithm draws on the entire structure of the Web. Distributed moderation relies on local knowledge: mailing list
moderators have experience with their members’ sense of
128
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I am indebted to Sarah Jeong for pointing out this distinction.
See Lee Knuttila, User Unknown: 4chan, Anonymity, and Contingency,
FIRST MONDAY, Oct. 3, 2011, http://firstmonday.org/article/view/3665/3055
[http://perma.cc/VP3A-57CS] (explaining how ephemerality of posts on
4chan is responsible for "a unique, virtual ontological experience" and
"fortuitous encounter[s]").
See Auerbach, supra note 55; Jay Allen, How Chan-Style Anonymous Culture Shapes #gamergate, STORIFY (Dec. 3, 2014), https://storify.com/a_man
_in_black/how-chan-style-anonymous-culture-shapes-gamergate [https://p
erma.cc/AFN4-PW9S].
Cf. Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic
Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 716 (1986).
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which messages are off-topic. Centralized moderation offers the
ability to stop unwanted content and participants by creating a
single checkpoint through which all must pass: a spammer
kicked off of Facebook will not bother anyone else on Facebook.
But chokepoints are also single points of failure: a spammer
who gets through on Facebook can bother a lot of people. In
comparison, distributed moderation offers more robustness and
defense in depth. Centralized moderation offers a clear focal
point for policy-making. If you don’t like my post, you know
where to complain. Distributed moderation permits those with
ideological differences to agree to disagree: if you don’t want to
read my weblog, no one is putting it in front of you.
In a sense, the choice between centralized and distributed
exclusion is the choice between a single community and many.
Similarly, the choice between centralized and distributed pricing is the choice between a big-box retailer and a bazaar of
many small merchants. It is in organization that the dichotomy
between centralized and distributed moderation is the sharpest
and the richest. A search engine is powerfully centralized; a
social network devolves many organizational decisions to
members who decide which friends to share and converse with.
Taxonomies are centralized annotation; folksonomies of userassigned tags are distributed annotation.132 A top-ten list is a
centralized filter; user-created playlists are distributed filters.
But norms, by their nature, cannot be fully centralized. The
power to adopt, shape, or reject them is always in the hands of
members. The larger a community, the more competing voices
and normative focal points it is likely to have.
C.

Community Characteristics (Adjectives)

Just as one size does not fit all forms of moderation, one
size does not fit all communities. Communities differ along
many axes: the email system has different properties than
Wikipedia, which has different properties than the comments
section of a blog. Four characteristics of a community are particularly important in affecting the kinds of strategic behavior
threatening it and the effectiveness of various types of moderation: (1) the capacity of the infrastructure, (2) the size of the
user community, (3) the distribution of ownership, and (4) the
identifiability of participants. As with the adverbs above, these
characteristics are mostly independent of each other.
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See Adam Mathes, Folksonomies—Cooperative Classification and Communication Through Shared Metadata 3-5 (2004), http://adammathes.com
/academic/computer-mediated-communication/folksonomies.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/Y5KE-RMCY].
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Infrastructure Capacity

Infrastructure’s capacity—hard drive space, bandwidth,
processing power, electric power, etc.—affects its ability to
support members’ use. Where there is too much use for a given
capacity, congestion results. Members find the system unpleasant, unreliable, or unusable. In theory, it is almost always possible to add infrastructure, increase capacity, and reduce congestion. But in practice, limited capacity affects the community
in two ways. First, infrastructure costs money, so paying for it
often requires pricing. Second, adding capacity takes time,
which means congestion can be a major short-run problem,
particularly in growing communities, even when long-run upgrades are feasible.133 Friendster stumbled over technical issues as it grew and was surpassed by MySpace,134 which stumbled in turn and was surpassed by Facebook.135
A community in which capacity is a significant bottleneck
looks very different from one in which it is not. With little capacity, the common-pool resource problem at the infrastructure
level dominates, favoring moderation that closely regulates usage: exclusion, pricing, and deletion. As capacity increases, infrastructure recedes and content comes to the fore. There may
still be cacophony, abuse, and manipulation, but these problems are more amenable to additive solutions, as captured in
the slogan that the best remedy for bad speech is more speech.
Annotation, filtration, synthesis, and norm-setting become
comparatively more attractive. Where the balance between capacity constraints and cognitive constraints falls will vary by
community. Ones in which members share rich multimedia
content will experience congestion sooner and more painfully
than ones in which members share short textual content.136
The minimum practical unit of infrastructure is often sufficient to enable a great deal of use, making it an important spe-
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Infrastructure can be lumpy. When a community has outgrown its first
server, it cannot easily add one-tenth of a second server. You cannot make
a terabyte database simply by connecting a thousand gigabyte databases
to each other. Cloud computing, however, is smoothing out infrastructure
capacity by making it much easier to throw more computing resources at a
problem, quickly and scalably.
See Gary Rivlin, Wallflower at the Web Party, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/business/yourmoney/15friend.html
[http://perma.cc/E8EE-K254].
See JULIA ANGWIN: STEALING MYSPACE: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE MOST
POPULAR WEBSITE IN AMERICA 246-53 (2009).
Compare, e.g., TWITCH, http://www.twitch.tv [http://perma.cc/5PG9-PKLB]
(users share gaming videos), with YO, http://www.justyo.co [http://perma
.cc/ZUC2-VSWM] (users share the word “Yo”).
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cial case of abundance.137 For less than $250, you can buy a
computer capable of carrying out two billion operations per second and with a hard drive capable of storing half a million
full-text novels.138 Accordingly, a typical blog could receive
thousands of comments a month without increasing its owner’s
costs in the slightest. When participants bring their own infrastructure—as in peer-to-peer systems—they may be able to
support a substantial community without substantial effort.
Growth out of this range creates an important scale transition:
capacity becomes something the community must worry about,
pay for, and safeguard.
2.

Community Size

Closely related to infrastructure capacity is the number of
members in a community. One important issue, discussed
above, plays out at the infrastructure layer: more members
means greater use and thus greater congestion.139 The more
interesting consequences of increasing community size play out
at the information layer. There are two offsetting effects for
readers and authors. On the one hand, greater size catalyzes
informational network effects in this two-sided market for attention: readers would rather join a fan fiction community with
ten thousand stories than one with ten, while authors would
rather post to a fan fiction community with ten thousand readers than one with ten. These effects are critical when a community starts. Like airplanes, communities need forward momentum to take off.140 On the other hand, a large community of
authors will generate cacophony, making moderation increasingly essential if readers are to find anything of value. Once a
fan fiction community has ten thousand stories, it needs tags or
a search function to separate the Harry/Draco slash141 from the
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See Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273,
301-04 (2004).
As of March 2015, a Dell Inspiron 14-inch laptop with a 500-gigabyte hard
drive and a 2.16-gigahertz CPU cost $229.99 on sale from Dell.com. See
New Inspiron 14 3000 Series Laptop, DELL, http://www.dell.com/us/p/inspi
ron-14-3451-laptop/pd [http://perma.cc/8DWA-JXK6]. Also as of March
2015, Amazon Web Services offers 750 hours of computing time per month
and tens of gigabytes of storage for free. See AWS Free Tier, AMAZON,
http://aws.amazon.com/free [http://perma.cc/X272-92C9].
This is the classic common-pool resource problem, and conventional wisdom recommends restricting community membership for just this reason.
See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 38, at 91-92.
The importance of catalyzing the initial roll-out of a community is a recurring focus of books on community management. See, e.g., NG, supra note
15, at 113-23.
See, e.g., Blackie & Yoyo, [Tag: Harry/Draco], FUCK YEAH HP SLASH, http:
//fuckyeahhpslash.tumblr.com/tagged/draco [http://perma.cc/D5V5-4FYR].
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Ronbledore,142 and stars or favorites or votes to filter the cream
from the chaff. To summarize, the larger a community is, the
better it is at competing with external alternatives, but the
more internal moderation it requires.
Moreover, community size interacts with the effectiveness
of the forms of moderation. Growth is often notably unkind to
social norms. It is easier to maintain any given norm in a
smaller community than a larger one. As a community grows,
it becomes easier for individuals and groups to resist a norm.
This breakdown makes it harder to use social norms to moderate large communities. A group of twenty can operate by unspoken consensus in a way that a group of twenty thousand
cannot. Thus, decentralized moderation becomes increasingly
attractive as the community grows because it fragments the
community into smaller subcommunities that can maintain
their own norms. Reddit’s subreddits, described below, are a
superlative example. Exclusion can also be more difficult in a
large community because it is easier for the unwanted to sneak
in (for example, by stealing a password or giving a false name)
and avoid immediate detection.
On the other hand, pricing and organization can benefit
from community size. Pricing at scale benefits from the salamislicing effect: a great many small payments can add up to a
surprisingly large number. This is the key, for example, to advertising. Each pageview is good only for a small fraction of a
penny, but those fractions add up fast. Organization can take
advantage of the law of large numbers. Any individual moderator’s assessment of an action’s value may or may not accurately
reflect the community’s sense of value, but the average of a
thousand moderators’ assessments is likely to express it fairly
well. Thus, some techniques of synthesis become increasingly
reliable as the community grows. Google’s assessment of Web
pages’ importance, for example, synthesizes the individual decisions of many millions of Web authors. The same is true of
Amazon’s averages of user reviews, of Reddit’s upvoting algorithms,143 and even of American Idol.
Finally, community size shapes the way in which moderation can best be executed. All of the verbs have costs that increase with volume, and moderation requires greater and
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See estel, Weasley is Dumbledore Theory, If You Have Time to Spare, HARRY POTTER’S PAGE DISCUSSION BOARDS (MAY 21, 2004, 11:31 AM), http://ww
w.harrypotterspage.com/forums/index.php?s=&showtopic=393&view=find
post&p=17361 [http://perma.cc/Y8JG-WST8]; see generally Mallory Ortberg, Ronbledore Archive, THE TOAST, http://the-toast.net/tag/ronbledore
[http://perma.cc/MWF4-BR9N].
Indeed, the Reddit algorithm has been tweaked to reflect the fact that
assessments of content become more reliable as more people provide them.
See infra note 273.
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greater investments as a community grows. I have mentioned
the scale transition that occurs when a community becomes big
enough that it must start worrying about congestion. There is a
second common transition, which occurs when a community
becomes too big for one person to moderate without help. Professional moderation becomes attractive, but paying those professionals requires pricing. A third scale transition occurs when
the community becomes too big for any reasonably sized group
of humans to moderate entirely on their own. YouTube, for example, would need three shifts of six thousand employees each,
working around the clock, to prescreen all the videos uploaded
to the site.144 Either decentralized or automatic moderation—
and quite possibly both—becomes a necessity.
(1)

Ownership Concentration

Just as moderation can be centralized or distributed, so can
ownership. The two questions are distinct. Wikipedia has centralized ownership (the Wikimedia Foundation) but decentralized moderation. Bitcoin has centralized moderation (there is
only one blockchain) but decentralized ownership (many different people and organizations run computers that participate in
the Bitcoin network).145 For the sake of clarity, I will refer to
centralized ownership as concentrated, and decentralized ownership as dispersed.
Concentrated ownership has one substantial advantage:
there is only one owner whose account books must balance, rather than many. With dispersed ownership, if one of the many
owners finds that she is absorbing a disproportionate share of
the costs, she may simply withdraw. Put another way, concentrated owners can afford to be indifferent to the distribution of
costs, since one part of the infrastructure may subsidize another. The New York Times does not have to worry about separately accounting for the profit and loss of comments on each individual article on its website. Distributed owners have no choice
but to worry about the balance of payments. Such a system is
far more likely to be stable when the owners are also participants, so that they subsidize themselves. Peer-to-peer file sharing is the classic example of a case in which the rewards of participation induce users to contribute their computing resources
to the infrastructure. This self-organizing, self-provisioning as-
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See Statistics, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html
(last visited Jan. 20, 2015) [https://perma.cc/ZG7H-CL5J] (“100 hours of
video are uploaded to YouTube every minute.”). Assuming each moderator
can watch one video at a time, watching every video would therefore require 6,000 moderators working simultaneously, all the time.
See generally ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN: UNLOCKING DIGITAL CURRENCIES (2014) (describing Bitcoin).
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pect of dispersed ownership can be particularly robust in communities that do not rely heavily on exclusion or pricing.
Both forms of ownership can be useful in resisting attacks.
On the one hand, dispersed ownership can align incentives by
allocating the costs of heavy use to those users’ own portions of
the infrastructure.146 For example, in peer-to-peer file-sharing
networks, uers who are only willing to pay their ISPs for lowbandwitdh connections can download less than users who are
willing to pay more for faster connections. On the other hand, a
concentrated owner can mount a coordinated defense against
denial of service attacks. The other participants have no infrastructure of their own at risk. This point is more important
than it may seem at first because popularity can be an unintentional denial-of-service attack.147 If George Takei tweets
about your website, your server might crash.148 But if your Facebook Page goes viral, Facebook will take care of it without
blinking.
The choice to concentrate or disperse ownership also affects
the political economy of the choice among moderation techniques. Owners can use their power over the infrastructure
layer to make policy at the content layer, for good and for ill.
This is why Facebook had years of controversy over banning
breastfeeding photos: as infrastructure owner, it made and applied a broad anti-nudity moderation policy.149 Manipulation to
favor the owner’s interests is the constant fear.150 Distributed
ownership gives community members more power to force
democratic moderation decisions. To take a simple example,
compare the openness of the web with the walled garden that is
Facebook. For another, compare Bitcoin with Paypal.
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This is the pattern described by Smith in his study of the open-field semicommons, where farming ownership was divided into strips. See Smith,
supra note 48. He explains that the boundaries of privately held portions
can be set to prevent strategic behavior—in the case of the open fields, to
make it hard for shepherds to concentrate grazing harms on particular
owners.
See Slashdot Effect, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes
/slashdot-effect [http://perma.cc/U3N4-ZEPK].
See Anna Leach, Mr. Sulu Causes DDoS Panic After Posting Link on Facebook, THE REGISTER, June 8, 2012, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/06
/08/takei_ddos_facebook_fans [http://perma.cc/M5KW-NJXA].
See Soraya Chemaly, #FreeTheNipple: Facebook Changes Breastfeeding
Mothers Photo Policy, HUFFINGTON POST, June 9, 2014, http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/soraya-chemaly/freethenipple-facebook- changes_b_5473467
.html [http://perma.cc/8976-4D37].
See, e.g., Christian Sandvig, Corrupt Personalization, SOCIAL MEDIA COLLECTIVE, June 26, 2014, http://socialmediacollective.org/2014/06/26/corrupt
-personalization [http://perma.cc/AJ7M-Q4ZP].
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Identity

The final community characteristic is the distinction between identity and anonymity. At one extreme, participants in
an online community could be completely identified, bringing
with them a complete biography of their online and offline
lives. At the other, they could be completely anonymous.151
Compare Google+, which launched with a strict, stringently
enforced, and much-criticized “real names” policy,152 with
4chan, where “most posts . . . are disconnected from any identity.”153 There are many gradations in between.154 Participants
could have identities that mostly match their offline lives, but
in which the details are potentially questionable, as in an
online dating service where participants sometimes lie about
their height.155 They could have rich and persistent but avowedly fictitious identities, as in virtual worlds where they play
the same avatar thirty hours a week for years. They could have
stable but thin identities, as on a discussion board that uses
pseudonyms and keeps users’ real names and email addresses
secret. They could have thin identities purely as a matter of
convention, as in some blogs’ comment sections, where a commenter can pick a fresh display name with each comment. Participants could even have one level of identifiability at the infrastructure level (supply a valid email address to sign up) but
a different level at the content layer (that email address is hidden from other participants). Whatever its nature, the most
important role of identity is creating stable reputations
through time so that others can link past behavior to a present
identity.156
All four verbs of moderation can tap into identity. Exclusion
absolutely depends on it; without identity, the distinction between “outsiders” and “insiders” collapses. You can identify the
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See, e.g., E. Gabriella Coleman, Our Weirdness Is Free, TRIPLE CANOPY
(Jan. 2012), http://www.canopycanopycanopy.com/contents/our_weirdness
_is_free [http://perma.cc/DV5P-AYX3] (discussing “the sublimation of
identity” in hacker collective Anonymous).
See Jillian York, A Case for Pseudonyms, DEEPLINKS, July 29, 2011, https:
//www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/07/case-pseudonyms [https://perma.cc/RU9U
-DCPM] (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
Michael S. Bernstein et al., 4chan and /b/: An Analysis of Anonymity and
Ephemerality in a Large Online Community, PROC. INT’L CONF. ON WEBLOGS AND SOCIAL MEDIA 3 (2011) (emphasis added); see also Auerbach, supra note 55.
See generally FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 21-36 (presenting graphical grammar of reputation).
See Christian Rudder, The Big Lies People Tell in Online Dating, OKTRENDS (July 7, 2010), http://blog.okcupid.com/index.php/the-biggest-liesin-online-dating [http://perma.cc/7W4R-YVQ9].
See, e.g., FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 17 (describing “The Reputation Virtuous Cycle”).
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unwanted outsiders and blacklist them or identify the wanted
insiders and whitelist them, but both versions require some
notion of identity.157 As anyone who has moderated a blog’s
comments can testify, this is a huge problem for communities
that are open to new and unknown members from the Internet
at large. There is often no way to tell that a “new” commenter
is actually an old and well-known miscreant, back from a ban
for another round of malice.158
In theory, pricing could be identity-free—transactional and
transitory. But in practice, any explicit pricing system will depend on some non-trivial identity infrastructure, such as a
credit card processor. Having a credit card number is not necessarily a guarantee of anything, but it is a significant identity
hurdle, and one that many online businesses, for example, use
to create some minimal level of accountability among users.
More complex pricing builds on persistent identity. “For $10,
you can post as often as you want for a year” requires a notion
of “you” that will be stable for a year.
Organization can both piggyback on and produce identity.
Filtering and deletion both often treat the identity of an author
as a significant data point. Most anti-spam systems, for example, use whitelisting to allow trusted senders’ emails to bypass
the spam check altogether. In reputation systems, participants
provide annotations on each other’s actions, and those annotations become part of one’s community identity.159 eBay’s feedback system, in which buyers and sellers use feedback left by
others to decide whom to trust, is an example of reputational
annotation. Slashdot’s multi-level moderation system has several variables that use others’ ratings of one’s actions to decide
how much power one will have to moderate in the future.160
It is well known that identifiability plays a significant role
in setting social norms.161 Persistent reputations make it possible for participants to build credibility as respected elders within the community.162 They make it possible to hold participants
accountable for their actions, enabling the effective monitoring
and graduated sanctions beloved by commons scholars.163 By
contrast, anonymity enables consequence-free norm violation
157
158
159
160
161

162
163

See generally PREECE, supra note 15, at 96-97.
KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 138.
See generally FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16.
See Lampe, supra note 84.
Lessig famously described the difference in tone between two class newsgroups, one anonymous and one with stronger identity; the anonymous
one was hijacked by a malicious flamer. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 10206 (2006). See generally Bryan H. Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 MD.
L. REV. 501 (2013).
See, e.g., Warnick, supra note 20, at 103-04.
See KRAUT & RESNICK, supra note 17, at 155-57; OSTROM, supra note 38, at
94-100; see generally FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16.
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and can undermine the appearance of reciprocity among real
human beings. But stronger identity is not always better.
Sometimes it creates a badge for misbehavior: a leaderboard is
an invitation to fame-seeking cheaters. Making participants
more anonymous (for example, by resetting a server) can drive
trolls away because it deprives them of the opportunity to
make a (bad) name for themselves.
Paradoxically, both identity and its opposite—anonymity—
can be expensive to establish. Externally produced identity requires participants to prove facts about themselves, which can
cost both time and money. It also requires owners and moderators to be prepared to check these assertions, which too is costly. Internally produced reputation systems require participants
to take the time to learn about, comment on, and rate each other.164 An important question for online communities is who controls these socially constructed identities: users themselves, the
community, or infrastructure owners.165 Anonymity might
seem cheaper, but genuinely effacing participants’ identities
requires some significant effort—deleting log files, stripping
out snooping software, and taking action against participants
who “out” one another’s offline identities.
Finally, identity can be the enemy of privacy, for good and
for bad. Divulging information about oneself is itself a cost.
Privacy is virtually a precondition for some kinds of speech.
Some conversations simply cannot take place in public. This
phenomenon can be good: think of therapeutic conversations on
a discussion board for adult victims of childhood abuse. It can
also be bad: think of virulently misogynistic and racist conversations on a law student board.
Two forms of abuse are characteristically tied to the misuse
of identity. Impersonation—the hijacking of another’s identity—requires that participants have recognizable identities to
hijack.166 And sock puppetry—creating fake personas to create
the false appearance of support for a position—requires that
the community recognize personas as distinct participants in
the first place.167 Both become possible when a community ac-
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FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 223-41.
See, e.g., Beth Simone Noveck, Trademark Law and the Social Construction of Trust: Creating the Legal Framework for Online Identity, 83 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1733 (2005); Omer Tene, Me, Myself, and I: Aggregated and Disaggregated Identities on Social Networking Service, 8 J. INT’L COM. L. &
TECH. 118 (2013).
See, e.g., Dylan Loeb McClain, Chess Group Officials Accused of Using
Internet to Hurt Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007.
See, e.g., Simon Owens, The Battle to Destroy Wikipedia’s Biggest Sockpuppet Army, THE DAILY DOT, Oct. 8, 2013, http://www.dailydot.com/lifesty
le/wikipedia-sockpuppet-investigation-largest-network-history-wiki-pr [ht
tp://perma.cc/2E4D-BEZ2].
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cepts claims of identity that it is not capable of properly validating.
III.

Case Studies

This Part discusses four case studies to give a feel for how
moderation can play out in practice.168 Two (Wikipedia and
MetaFilter) are hard-won successes. One (the Los Angeles
Times wikitorial) was an abject failure. The fourth (Reddit) is
deeply ambivalent—an immensely popular site with an immensely loyal user base that is nonetheless also responsible for
some notoriously destructive episodes.
A.

Wikipedia

Other than the Internet itself, Wikipedia is the preeminent
example of successful online collaboration.169 It started as an
offshoot of Nupedia, one of several attempts in the 1990s and
early 2000s to create an online encyclopedia through volunteer
contributions.170 Nupedia relied on peer-reviewed contributions
from experts—centralized, transparent, ex ante human exclusion and organization—but its founders, Jimmy Wales and
Larry Sanger, were frustrated at the slow pace of contributions. Sanger’s friend Ben Kovitz suggested that Nupedia use a
wiki for initial collaboration on articles that would then go
through the full editorial review.171 And thus, on January 15,
2001, Wikipedia was born.172 It took off so rapidly that “when
the server hosting Nupedia crashed in September 2003 (with
little more than twenty-four complete articles and seventy-four
more in progress) it was never restored.”173 Today the Englishlanguage Wikipedia alone has over four and a half million articles. Twenty-three million registered users and countless
anonymous ones have made more than seven hundred million
edits.174 One meta-analysis concluded that Wikipedia has “a
valuation in the tens of billions of dollars, a one-time replace168
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Other case studies illustrate the principles as well. See, e.g., FARMER &
GLASS, supra note 16, at 243-77 (Yahoo! Answers); Grimmelmann, Semicommons, supra note 37, at 2831-39 (USENET).
See generally PHOEBE AYERS, CHARLES MATTHEWS & BEN YATES, HOW WIKIPEDIA WORKS: AND HOW YOU CAN BE A PART OF IT (2008); ANDREW DALBY,
THE WORLD AND WIKIPEDIA: HOW WE ARE EDITING REALITY (2009);
JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83; LIH, supra note 11; JOSEPH REAGLE, GOOD
FAITH COLLABORATION: THE CULTURE OF WIKIPEDIA (2010).
See LIH, supra note 11, at 32-41.
REAGLE, supra note 169, at 39. See generally BO LEUF & WARD CUNNINGHAM, THE WIKI WAY: ONLINE COLLABORATION ON THE WEB (2001) (describing wiki technology).
See LIH, supra note 11, at 60-67.
REAGLE, supra note 169, at 40; see also JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 11
(explaining that twenty thousand articles were created in the first year).
See Wikipedia:Statistics, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedi
a:Statistics [http://perma.cc/7LC2-GYLC] (last visited Jan. 20, 2015).
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ment cost of $6.6 billion with an annual updating cost of $630
million, and consumer benefit in the hundreds of billions of dollars.”175
A wiki is merely a tool: switching from Microsoft Word to
MediaWiki will not make you a master encyclopedist, just as
Diderot and d'Alembert’s success in creating the Encyclopédie
was not a matter of having better pens than other philosophes.
Rather, the technical switch from Nupedia to Wikipedia mattered because it enabled a social shift—dropping the exclusion
and switching from ex ante to ex post organization. Editors
could now draw on a much larger pool of potential contributors
and improve each other’s work incrementally, iteratively, and
interactively.176 These changes dramatically increased the
community size and dramatically reduced the implicit price of
participation. As new authors added more articles and improved existing ones, they quickly established strong, positive
norms. The initial success served as an advertisement for further participants and participation in a virtuous cycle of
growth.
Wikipedia’s system of moderation is sophisticated and intricate, but its two basic commitments have remained distributed
organization and strong social norms. The two are in significant tension.177 Most of Wikipedia’s moderation choices can be
understood in terms of the difficult task of sustaining normbased “soft security,” which works through “group dynamics
rather than hard-coded limits” in a massive community with
millions of members.178 “But Wikipedia’s openness isn’t a mistake; it’s the source of its success. A community solves problems that official leaders wouldn’t even know were there.”179
175

176

177
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179

Jonathan Band & Jonathan Gerafi, Wikipedia’s Economic Value (Oct. 7,
2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338563 [http://
perma.cc/58SJ-VZV7].
These are classic features of successful open source collaboration. See generally STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004). BENKLER, supra note 69, describes their broader applicability.
See REAGLE, supra note 169, at 83-88; Eric Goldman, Wikipedia’s Labor
Squeeze and Its Consequences, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 157 (2010);
Andrew George, Avoiding Tragedy in the Wiki-Commons, 12 VA. J.L. &
TECH. no. 8 (2007), http://www.vjolt.net/vol12/issue4/v12i4_a2-George.pdf
[http://perma.cc/HNV9-9GXU]; Aaron Halfaker et al., The Rise and Decline of an Open Collaboration System: How Wikipedia’s Reaction to Popularity Is Causing Its Decline, 57 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 664 (2012).
AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 45; see also Soft Security, MEATBALL WIKI,
http://meatballwiki.org/wiki/SoftSecurity
[http://perma.cc/G78W-9G3T];
Jimmy Wales, Foreword to LIH, supra note 11, at xvii-xviii (“[T]rying to
make sure that nobody can hurt anyone else actually eliminates all the
opportunities for trust.”); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 127-48 (2008).
Aaron Swartz, Who Runs Wikipedia?, RAW THOUGHT (Sept. 7, 2006),
http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/whorunswikipedia [http://perma.cc
/6MNH-2YYZ]. Swartz’s six-part series on Wikipedia’s self-moderation is
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The power of Wikipedia’s first commitment, to distributed
organization, is by now well established.180 Wikipedia uses it
with remarkable flexibility. The best Wikipedia articles are
synthesized from the contributions of thousands of authors,
and the hyperlinks between articles are a beautiful use of annotation.181 Organizationally, Wikipedia uses pages, subpages,
lists, lists of lists, categories, categories of categories, sidebars,
standardized templates, and even a special-purpose markup
and programming language, all tools that enable the richly
multimedia and complexly interlinked web of knowledge.182
These are ex ante filtering carried out by authors and moderators; they split the flood of information into manageable
streams. Further, Wikipedia offers readers ex post filtering
though its search engine.183 It also enjoys additional filtering
simply as a consequence of being openly available and searchable on the Web: if you want to learn about widgets, you need
only Google “wikipedia widget.” 184
Wikipedia’s pricing strategy similarly supports large-scale
participation. Just as it is open to anyone, it is also free to read
and to edit. Wikipedia’s socially beneficial mission allows it to
function as a charitable organization. The Wikimedia Foundation, which subsists on donations, keeps the site free for authors, readers, and moderators. Implicitly, the use of a wiki
makes it easy, at least in theory, for anyone to dive in and
make edits. Indeed, Wikipedia now prohibits undisclosed paid
editing because it is worried about incentives for manipulation.185
Wikipedia’s second commitment, to positive social norms, is
even richer and more complex. The basic attitude of epistemic
humility is summed up in the two mottoes “[adopt a] neutral
point of view” and “assume [that others are acting in] good
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well worth reading, and holds up quite well eight years later. See also
James Grimmelmann, Seven Wikipedia Fallacies, THE LABORATORIUM
(Aug. 27, 2006), http://laboratorium.net/archive/2006/08/27/seven_wikiped
ia_fallacies_1 [http://perma.cc/C3E8-BRWY].
See generally WEBER, supra note 176; Benkler, supra note 39.
For example, as of November 3, 2014, the readable and informative article
on West Point was roughly 13,000 words long and had been edited 3,815
times by 1,252 editors.
See generally AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 68-298 (describing Wikipedia’s technical organization).
See id. at 60-65. Another useful reader filtering technique is the “watchlist,” which provides an editor with a chronological list of edits to whichever pages she wishes to track. See Help:Watching pages, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Watching_pages [http://perma.cc/T3B2-V
8CS].
See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 65-76.
See Terms of use/FAQ on paid contributions without disclosure, WIKIPEDIA, https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Terms_of_use/FAQ_on_paid_contribu
tions_without_disclosure [https://perma.cc/5H24-FQSZ].
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faith.”186 Editors are expected to adhere to these attitudinal
norms while editing pages in order to advance an extensive list
of substantive standards for articles (they are expected, for example, to make entries verifiable by citing reliable sources187
and to craft entries of appropriate length188) and are expected
to follow extensive procedural rules189 (for example, the procedures for deleting a controversial entry190). Reproducing these
norms requires an immense amount of work.191 In fact, simply
learning the social ropes of Wikipedia can be notoriously discouraging to new members.192 The endless restatement of Wikipedian norms—often in the process of accusing others of violating them—testifies to just what a big job this is in a community the size of Wikipedia.193 Indeed, Wikipedia has an extensive parallel architecture of talk pages devoted to conversations
about Wikipedia and its norms.194 The norms of discourse here
are rich. There is even a tradition of Wikipedia humor.195
Wikipedia does not run on exhortation alone. Beneath the
surface, its moderators use the other verbs of moderation
extensively to sustain positive norms. The most important
decision is structural, and so deeply embedded in the idea of a
wiki that it can be invisible: Wikipedia is highly modular, and
its editorial work factors into loosely coupled subunits.196
Wikipedia would not work—it could not work—if it consisted of
a single massive webpage that only one person at a time could
186
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See REAGLE, supra note 169, at 45-71 (describing Wikipedia’s “collaborative culture”); see generally Wikipedia: Civility, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikip
edia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Civility [http://perma.cc/FS37-ZP5H]; Wikipedia:
Neutral Point of View, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:
Neutral_point_of_view [http://perma.cc/JMA4-9Z59]. Dariusz Jemielniak
argues that Wikipedia’s policy against personal attacks is central to its
culture. See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 17-18.
Wikipedia: Verifiability, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia
:Verifiability [http://perma.cc/L425-K4DG].
Wikipedia: Article Size, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia
:Article_size [http://perma.cc/CY68-3V94].
See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 363-81 (summarizing policies).
Wikipedia: Deletion Process, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki
pedia:Deletion_process [http://perma.cc/8P7A-NGXJ].
See generally JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83; REAGLE, supra note 169.
See generally E. GABRIELLA COLEMAN, CODING FREEDOM: THE ETHICS AND
AESTHETICS OF HACKING 123-60 (2013) (describing the process of norm
transmission in a community of open-source hackers).
See, e.g., JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83.
See, e.g., id. at 92-96.
See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 350-53; REAGLE, supra note 169, at
68-70.
On modularity in general, see HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE
ARTIFICIAL (1969). For a powerful application of modularity to open collaborative projects, see Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, The Architecture
of Participation: Does Code Architecture Mitigate Free Riding in the Open
Source Development Model?, 52 MGMT. SCI. 1116 (2006).
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edit. Instead, it is split into different linguistic versions,197 into
WikiProjects for specific topics,198 and into individual pages
(each with its own associated Talk page for discussion).199 For
one thing, this factoring allows different editors to work in
parallel, making independent decisions. For another, it allows
different groups of editors to work in parallel, creating smaller
and more cohesive subcommunities with a more localized sense
of purpose and stronger shared norms.200
In sustaining its collaborative norms, Wikipedia also makes
subtle and judicious compromises on openness, using deletion
and exclusion in controversial but probably necessary ways.
Take a simple act of vandalism akin to the one that brought
down the Los Angeles Times wikitorial: changing the Wikipedia
page on the Iraq War to say “FUCK USA.” Wikipedia has entire projects devoted to fighting vandalism.201 Some users sign
up for a “recent changes patrol” or “counter-vandalism unit”
and watch for suspicious changes to attractive targets, like politically controversial pages.202 When they see an obvious act of
vandalism, they revert the edit and restore the page to its previous state. This is ex post, distributed, transparent, human
deletion. Other users run bots that watch for recent changes
and revert changes that are especially likely to be vandalism,
as when a page goes from thousands of words to two.203 This is
ex post, distributed, transparent, automatic deletion. These anti-vandalism efforts are why, despite the large number of bogus
edits daily, most Wikipedia articles are in good shape most of
the time. Vandals who don’t succeed quickly tend to give up
quickly.204
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See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 407-18; LIH, supra note 11, at 133-67.
See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 212-16.
See generally id. at 99-117; Almila Akdag Shah et al., Generating Ambiguities: Mapping Category Names of Wikipedia to UDC Class Numbers, in
CRITICAL POINT OF VIEW: A WIKIPEDIA READER 63-77 (Geert Lovink & Nathaniel Tkacz eds., 2011) (describing complexities in Wikipedia’s classification systems).
This is an example of an effect described by Howard Rheingold: online,
small and dispersed communities of interest can find each other for collaborative purposes. See generally RHEINGOLD, supra note 20.
See Wikipedia: Cleaning up Vandalism, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/Wikipedia:Cleaning_up_vandalism [http://perma.cc/H8WP-5NKS].
Wikipedia: Recent Changes Patrol, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Wikipedia:Recent_changes_patrol [http://perma.cc/4DKH-UJCB]; Wikipedia: Counter-Vandalism Unit, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Wikipedia:Counter-Vandalism_Unit [http://perma.cc/UFZ3-LTET].
See Geiger, supra note 102; Jesse Hicks, This Machine Kills Trolls, THE
VERGE, Feb. 18, 2014, http://www.theverge.com/2014/2/18/5412636/thismachine-kills-trolls-how-wikipedia-robots-snuff-out-vandalism [http://per
ma.cc/5HGX-DB2P]. Bots are also useful for repetitive tasks such spellchecking and filling basic articles with standardized information (e.g.,
county demographics). See LIH, supra note 11, at 99-106.
See ZITTRAIN, supra note 178, at 138-39.
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Wikipedia has sterner stuff in store when reversion isn’t
enough. Some articles are “semi-protected”: only logged-in users can edit them, thus adding enough of a cost barrier to deter
casual vandals.205 Highly controversial articles may be “fully
protected”: only the much smaller group of administrators can
make changes to them.206 Protection switches from ex post to ex
ante deletion, trading off openness for better protection against
cacophony, abuse, and manipulation. Protection is regularly
used not merely to prevent norm-defying users from making
changes, but also to reassert norms without aliening users by
establishing “cooling off” periods.207
When protection doesn’t work, Wikipedia can also act
against users themselves. Those who engage in large-scale
vandalism or serious abuse, or who flout other important community policies, can be banned. Their accounts are prevented
from making any edits at all, either to a few specific pages, or
in severe cases, to Wikipedia as a whole.208 Since there are also
anonymous users and banned users who return with sockpuppet accounts, Wikipedia also blocks anonymous edits from
some IP addresses entirely.209 Banning and blocking are centralized, ex post, human, transparent exclusion. These methods
are imposed by administrators through a review process that
includes appeals.
As this discussion suggests, Wikipedia has a complicated
relationship to identity. On the one hand, the fundamental
“anyone can edit” policy acts as a strong check on pressures to
prevent all anonymous edits.210 Indeed, it gives Wikipedia a
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Wikipedia: Protection Policy, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki
pedia:Protection_policy [http://perma.cc/BV9Q-DT2A].
Id. Currently, there are about 1,400 administrators on the Englishlanguage Wikipedia, who are selected through discussion and voting by
other Wikipedians. See Wikipedia: Administrators, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wi
kipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Administrators [http://perma.cc/X7VB-7F95].
Wikipedia: Banning Policy, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikip
edia:Banning_policy [http://perma.cc/FM6L-SN33].
See R. Stuart Geiger & David Ribes, The Work of Sustaining Order in
Wikipedia: The Banning of a Vandal, PROC. ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER
SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK (2010), http://www.stuartgeiger.com/paper
s/cscw-sustaining-order-wikipedia.pdf [http://perma.cc/7Y46-AGEP].
Wikipedia: Blocking IP Addresses, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Wikipedia:Blocking_IP_addresses [http://perma.cc/D37W-2RJM]. In 2014,
Wikipedia blocked an IP address associated with the House of Representatives from anonymous edits because of “disruptive editing.” See Abby
Phillip, Wikipedia Blocks Anonymous Edits (and Trolling) from a Congressional IP Address, WASH. POST SWITCH BLOG (July 24, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/07/24/wikiped
ia-blocks-anonymous-edits-and-trolling-from-a-congressional-ip-address
[http://perma.cc/LA5W-U6F4].
See Wikipedia: Introduction, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki
pedia:Introduction [http://perma.cc/2Q2J-DEEU] (“Don't be afraid to ed-
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strong (though much-criticized211) anti-expert ethos, in which
offline credentials are nominally considered irrelevant to one’s
authority as an editor.212 On the other hand, for registered users, Wikipedia is a surveillance society: user pages track one’s
complete editing history.213 Reputation plays a major role in
the Wikipedia community. One is expected to have a substantial history of numerous productive edits to be accepted as a
trusted voice.214 Editors also celebrate each other’s work, individually with “barnstars” (images awarded for feats of hard but
valuable work),215 and collectively by making especially good
articles “featured” on the Wikipedia homepage,216 thereby using reputation to fuel positive norms.
Relatedly, transparency is a key aspirational virtue. Because every edit is logged, Wikipedians are expected to explain
and if necessary defend their actions in sometimes excruciating
detail. The process of being given administrator privileges can
involve a harrowing examination of one’s editing history, often
by other editors with an axe to grind.217 Decisions on everything from whether to rename a page to whether to ban a user
are also debated publicly, often ad nauseam. Opacity is anathema. A persistent, if overblown, criticism of administrators is
that they have access to private mailing lists.218 Wikipedia’s

211

212

213

214
215

216

217
218

it—anyone can edit almost every page, and we are encouraged to be
bold.”).
See, e.g., DALBY, supra note 169, at 50-81 (collecting criticisms); Criticism
of Wikipedia, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Wikipe
dia [http://perma.cc/5UE4-T2PR]. But see Clay Shirky, Larry Sanger, Citizendium, and the Problem of Expertise, MANY 2 MANY (Sept. 18, 2006) (arguing that that Wikipedia succeded where Nupedia failed because it
avoided the institutional overhead costs created by deference to experts).
See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 106-124 (arguing that Wikipedia trusts
procedures rather than people). Famously, Philip Roth was considered not
to be a reliable source when changing an entry to describe the origins of
his novel, The Human Stain. See Phillip Roth, An Open Letter to Wikipedia, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.newyorker.com/bo
oks/page-turner/an-open-letter-to-wikipedia [http://perma.cc/TN3T-KB7G].
See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 87-99 (discussing control through tracking); see also Geiger, supra note 102, at 83-92 (describing extensive controversy over a bot that added signatures to users’ comments on talk pages).
See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 39-41.
See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 333-34. Wikipedia: Barnstars, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Barnstars [http://perma.cc/7
LQU-L3RV]. For the history and nomenclature of Barnstars, see BarnStar, MEATBALLWIKI, http://meatballwiki.org/wiki/BarnStar [http://perma
.cc/AM8X-YEP3].
See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 227-28; Wikipedia: Featured Articles,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Featured_articles [http:
//perma.cc/H775-JTP5].
See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 37-50.
See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 50-58; Ayelet Oz, “Move Along Now,
Nothing to See Here”: The Private Discussion Spheres of Wikipedia (Aug.
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use of open-source software and freely licensed contributions
also mean that forking is always a possibility.219
Wikipedia’s dispute resolution system is complex and multitiered, as might be expected from a project as capacious and
contentious as creating a global encyclopedia. Officially, at
least, it tries to operate by consensus.220 Initially, many differences of opinion are simply argued over until one side or the
other is either persuaded or gives up.221 Other questions, such
as whether to delete an article or how best to describe a political issue neutrally, may be put to a vote of all interested Wikipedians. The votes themselves are usually non-binding; they
serve instead as a tool for measuring consensus. When that
doesn’t suffice, both a Mediation Committee and an Arbitration
Committee exist to hear disputes through a relatively formal
multi-level process.222 Beyond that, the nonprofit Wikimedia
Foundation, which oversees Wikipedia in the role of owner,223
can ultimately step in, although it generally tries to avoid be-

219

220
221

222

223

29, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1726450
[http://perma.cc/U2MZ-GADA].
In a fork, a group of participants makes a copy of another shared, freelylicensed informational resource and work on the newly independent copy
rather than on the original. See Andrew Famigletti, The Right to Fork: A
Historical Survey of De/Centralization in Wikipedia, in CRITICAL POINT OF
VIEW: A WIKIPEDIA READER 296-308 (Geert Lovink & Nathaniel Tkacz eds.,
2011); Nathaniel Tkacz, The Politics of Forking Paths, in CRITICAL POINT
OF VIEW: A WIKIPEDIA READER 94-107 (Geert Lovink & Nathaniel Tkacz
eds., 2011). The most famous fork of Wikipedia is Citizendium, created by
Wikipedia co-founder Larry Sanger to give more deference to credentialed
experts. See Timothy B. Lee, Citzendium Turns Five, But the Wikipedia
Fork is Dead in the Water, ARS TECHNICA. Oct. 27, 2011, http://arstechnica
.com/tech-policy/2011/10/five-year-old-wikipedia-fork-is-dead-in-the-water
[http://perma.cc/5ZPU-UNYV] (discussing history of Citizendium).
See REAGLE, supra note 169, at 97-115.
See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 76-81 (describing different “trajectories”
that conflicts on Wikipedia can take).
See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 81-84; David Hoffman & Salil Mehra,
Wikitruth Through Wikiorder, 59 EMORY L.J. 151 (2010) (arguing that
Wikipedia’s dispute resolution procedures work mainly by weeding out
problematic users who will not adhere to Wikipedia’s discourse norms);
Sara Gwendolyn Ross, Your Day in ‘Wiki-Court’: ADR, Fairness, and Justice in Wikipedia’s Global Community (Osgoode Legal Studies, Research
Paper No. 56, 2014).
See AYERS ET AL., supra note 169, at 447-53; Mayo Fuster Morell, The
Wikimedia Foundation and the Governance of Wikipedia’s Infrastructure,
in CRITICAL POINT OF VIEW: A WIKIPEDIA READER 325-41 (Geert Lovink &
Nathaniel Tkacz eds., 2011); see generally Jyh-An Lee, Organizing the
Unorganized: The Role of Nonprofit Organizations in the Commons Communities, 50 JURIMETRICS 275 (2010) (arguing that the nonprofit organizational form presents distinctive trust advantages for stewards of commons-based communities).
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coming involved in specific issues.224 Wikipedia takes its community democracy as seriously as it can.
Wikipedia is a sprawling, messy, and often bureaucratic organization. It combines norm-setting, exclusion, pricing, and
organization. Its moderation is human, automatic, transparent,
opaque, ex ante, ex post, centralized, and distributed. Its participants fight about everything—from the Shakespeare authorship question to the choice between “Gdańsk” and “Danzig”225—
at great length. These endless wrangles are not simply wasted
breath, or signs of a community about to crack apart. They are
part and parcel of why Wikipedia works. The free encyclopedia
is not free: its participants create it at great expense of time
and effort. Not all of that effort goes into research and writing.
The greater part of it is spent on the community-oriented work
that actually holds Wikipedia together—the work of moderation.
B.

The Los Angeles Times Wikitorial

The Los Angeles Times ignored all of this. Like Wikipedia, it
was open to the world, but it had none of Wikipedia's devices
for helping the well intentioned collaborate while keeping the
ne’er-do-wells at bay. Unlike Wikipedia, the Times had no way
to block persistently harmful users—not even a mechanism to
track and identify the worst abusers. Unlike Wikipedia, it had
no back channel for users to converse and develop community
norms226 or dispute-resolution mechanisms to contain conflict,
and the experiment failed long before they could evolve. The
Times forced users with strongly divergent beliefs on a controversial topic together, exacerbating normative conflict.227 It
brought them together for a one-off project, with no long-term
reputations to recognize trustworthy members of the community. It had no dedicated cadre of administrators cleaning up destructive edits. Vandals who saw the broken windows decided
to storm the front door.
224

225

226

227

See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 125-44 (describing the sometimes
fraught relationship between the Foundation and the Wikipedia community); Shun-Ling Chen, The Wikimedia Foundation and the SelfGoverning Community: A Dynamic Relationship Under Constant Negotiation, in CRITICAL POINT OF VIEW: A WIKIPEDIA READER 351-69 (Geert Lovink & Nathaniel Tkacz eds., 2011). Previously, Jimmy Wales acted as “benevolent dictator” before voluntarily sidelining himself to reduce controversy. See REAGLE, supra note 169, at 117-35 (theorizing the concept of
leadership via benevolent dictatorship)
See JEMIELNIAK, supra note 83, at 65-76 (describing four-year edit war);
LIH, supra note 11, at 122-32.
See OSTROM, supra note 38, at 100-01 (emphasizing the importance of
such fora).
Well into the experiment, Wikipedia’s Jimmy Wales tried to split the editorial into pro-war and anti-war versions to separate the warring camps,
but by then it was too late. See Rainey, supra note 8.
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The Los Angeles Times embraced Wikipedia’s technology
and its commitment to distributed organization, but neglected
its commitment to positive social norms. The wikitorial had
neither hard security nor soft. There were two kinds of naiveté
at work. First, there was the assumption that communities operate without moderation, that broad participation by itself
suffices. Second, there was the assumption that even if moderation were needed, it would develop spontaneously. The Los
Angeles Times neither moderated the wikitorial effectively nor
created the conditions under which the community of participants could develop its own effective moderation. The wikitorial was cargo cult collaboration.228
C.

MetaFilter

Not many online communities can say that they came together to save people from human trafficking, but MetaFilter
can.229 Two young Russian women had come to the United
States in May 2010 to work as lifeguards on Virginia Beach,
but when they arrived, their contact instead told them to come
to a bar on Long Island, the Lux Lounge, for some unspecified
hostess work. Annoyed at their unreliable employer but enjoying their American adventure, they called Dan Reetz, an American they had befriended in Russia two years before. Reetz,
who recognized the telltale signs of a sex-trafficking ring, was
immediately alarmed. But he “was in his car on a highway in
Wyoming with all his earthly belongings on his way to start a
new job,” and couldn’t convince his friends of the danger they
were in.230 Instead, he took the situation to MetaFilter.
MetaFilter, founded in 1999 by programmer and blogger
Matthew Haughey, calls itself a “community weblog.”231 It
hosts discussions on user-submitted topics on a text-heavy

228

229

230
231

Cf. Richard Feynman, Cargo Cult Science, in “SURELY YOU’RE JOKING, MR.
FEYNMAN!”: ADVENTURES OF A CURIOUS CHARACTER 338, 342 (1997) (“[T]hey
follow all the apparent precepts and forms . . . but they're missing something essential.”); see also Aaron Swartz, Making More Wikipedias, RAW
THOUGHT (Sep. 14, 2006), http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/morewikipedias
(“For the most part, people have simply assumed that Wikipedia is as
simple as the name suggests: install some wiki software, say that it’s for
writing an encyclopedia, and voila!—problem solved.”).
See Stephen Thomas, The Internet’s First Family, HAZLITT (Oct. 31, 2014),
http://penguinrandomhouse.ca/hazlitt/longreads/internets-first-family [ht
tp://perma.cc/R8WT-AMSZ]. The story unfolded in real time on the Metafilter thread Help me help my friend in DC, at http://ask.metafilter.com/15
4334/Help-me-help-my-friend-in-DC [http://perma.cc/6P36-WWPA], and
sparked extensive discussion on a related thread, The kindness of
strangers, http://metatalk.metafilter.com/19304/The-kindness-of-strangers
[http://perma.cc/67LP-PZY2].
Thomas, supra note 229.
METAFILTER, http://www.metafilter.com [http://perma.cc/4HSR-RDYS].
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website with a laid-back feel and a simple interface.232 Each
discussion—initiated when a logged-in user clicks on an unobtrusive text link to create a new post—starts with a link to a
page somewhere else on the web, along with a description to
provide some context. Each new post then appears on the front
page of the site, where the posts are sorted in reverse chronological order like a blog. Click on a post, and you go to a dedicated page for that post, where you can read previous readers’
comments and add your own. Users who aren’t logged in can
read posts and comments, but not add their own. The Metafilter community’s interests are diverse. As I write this, the
first three links feature rare concert footage of the Velvet Underground,233 an effort to stop public urination in India,234 and
pre-WWII African-American science fiction.235
Reetz posted to Ask MetaFilter, a sister site for questions to
the community. His post went up at 5:09 PM, and increasingly
concerned community members started exchanging information about the bar, the girls’ situation, and human trafficking resources. The next morning, another MetaFilter user, an
unemployed nanny named Katherine Gutierrez, operating on
almost no sleep, thought she might be able to divert the girls
from the very bad idea of going to the Lux Lounge at midnight.
She got their phone number from Reetz, and gave them a call.
To avoid alarming them about her own intentions, she “presented herself as Just Another Fun-loving Young Gal In The
Big City, Much Like Yourselves, and told the girls she’d gotten
their numbers from a mutual friend and would be happy to
hang out and show them around.”236 It worked. With the assistance of some plainclothes police and many other MetaFilter
users, she convinced the girls not to go to their meeting with
the mysterious and menacing “George.” Instead, “they ultimately stayed with her for a full month, during which time
MeFites [MetaFilter users] in New York and around the country sent the out-of-work nanny money to help feed the girls,
and helped also in other ways, such as taking the girls out on
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See generally Frequently Asked Questions, METATALK, http://faq.metafilter
.com [http://perma.cc/N49A-URA6] [hereinafter MetaFilter FAQ]; METAFILTER WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/Main_Page [http://perma.cc/4AP9GPSV].
item, Velvet Underground / Exploding Plastic Inevitable Live in Boston
1967, METAFILTER (May 26, 2014), http://www.metafilter.com/139386
[http://perma.cc/WKR8-4UE3].
KokoRyu, “How can India stop people urinating in public?”, METAFILTER
(May 26, 2014), http://www.metafilter.com/139385 [http://perma.cc/T57PBMF8].
Martin Wisse, Before Delany, before Butler, METAFILTER (May 26, 2014),
http://www.metafilter.com/139384 [http://perma.cc/9DE6-NUZ3].
Thomas, supra note 229.
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the town and putting them in touch with immigration lawyers
and employment agencies.”237
That’s MetaFilter in a nutshell (albeit its very best nutshell). Let’s dig in to how and why it works so well. In moderation terms, ex post, centralized, human norm-setting dominates, with editing and exclusion (and a tiny bit of pricing) in
supporting roles. The central technique of moderation is simple: Haughey and a small group of paid moderators238 read
posts and comments and take action against inappropriate
ones.239 Some receive a gentle chiding, in the form of a comment or email; others are deleted.240 Deleted posts are visible
on the site (since people may have left comments on them or
saved the URL), but they carry a short notice of why they were
removed—for example, because there is already an active discussion of the same story or issue on the site in another post.241
For particularly controversial or important actions, the moderators or concerned users will create a discussion post on MetaTalk, another sister site for conversations about Metafilter itself.242
The overriding goal is to maintain positive community
norms. In its initial days, Haughey was the primary author of
posts and was active in all discussion threads to set a good example. The moderators’ policy of hiding inappropriate material
quickly reinforces positive norms by making good behavior far
more visible than bad. The explanations treat users who make
mistakes as well-intentioned, and indicate that they are still
welcomed members of the community. These discussions invite
broad participation in articulating and shaping the community’s norms. This is deletion in service of social norms as much
as it is deletion for its own sake. The moderators enjoy substantial credibility on the site not just by virtue of their author237
238

239

240
241

242

Id.
See Mods, MEFI WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/Moderators [http://perma
.cc/Y8CP-R3SC]. While this Article was in press, Haughey announced his
retirement from MetaFilter to take up a day job, handing over the moderation reins to the other members of the team. See mathowie [Matthew
Haughey], Sixteen Years, METATALK (Mar. 4, 2015), http://metatalk.metafi
lter.com/23626/Sixteen-Years [http://perma.cc/6B6R-LQKS].
See Matt Haughey, Real World Moderation: Lessons from 11 Years of
Community, Presentation at SXSW Interactive (Mar. 12, 2011), available
at https://vimeo.com/21043675 [https://perma.cc/J3GP-SGKH].
See Warnick, supra note 20, at 120-23.
E.g., tofu_crouton [Sara Gore], We Must Not Call Him Sister, METAFILTER
(July 28, 2014), http://www.metafilter.com/141401/We-Must-Not-Call-Him
-Sister [http://perma.cc/JXV2-G4QN ] (“This post was deleted for the following reason: This kinda feels like a big fight in the making for no particular good reason. –cortex.”); see generally MetaFilter FAQ, supra note
232; METAFILTER DELETED POSTS, http://mefideleted.blogspot.com [http://
perma.cc/UK6C-XKGE].
METATALK, http://metatalk.metafilter.com [http://perma.cc/CC7E-ZBRW].
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ity, but because “they’ve proven over and over again that they
understand how communities work and deal with most issues
patiently and courteously.”243 Humility is a key virtue. Even a
recent visual makeover was an occasion for consultation rather
than simply being imposed from the top down.244
At the same time, the moderators and the community call
out particularly noteworthy posts and comments for praise.
Haughey maintains a small sideblog245 and a Twitter feed246
that he uses to link to high-quality posts. There is a small, unobtrusive button on Metafilter to mark any post or comment as
a “favorite”. The counts appear next to the post or comment
and on the user’s profile page, functioning as a visible symbol
of community praise. On Ask Metafilter, the question-asker can
flag replies as “best answers,” again a visible symbol of
praise.247 Users participate extensively in the explicit normsetting, too. They post comments rebuking and praising each
other,248 take their debates to MetaTalk,249 and occasionally
flag inappropriate posts and comments to bring them to the
moderators’ attention.250 A lightweight message system, MeFi
Mail, gives members a private back channel.251
The other verbs of moderation appear almost entirely in
secondary, supporting roles. There is a smattering of organization: posts can be tagged and searched. In a form of ex ante deletion, users are limited to one post per twenty-four hours
(though very few come anywhere near that pace). Commenting,
however, is unlimited. There is $5 signup fee for new members,252 which looks like pricing but functions more as a speed
bump to exclude participants not really interested in the com243

244

245

246

247
248

249

250
251
252

See Warnick, supra note 20, at 101 (quoting MetaFilter user Rhaomi); see
also Paul Lawton, Capital and Stratification Within Virtual Community:
A Case Study of Metafilter.com 87-91 (2003) (unpublished B.A. dissertation, University of Lethbridge), https://www.uleth.ca/dspace/bitstream/han
dle/10133/267/MR17405.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AU8-E52N].
See mathowie [Matt Haughey], A new theme for MeFi: Modern, METATALK
(Sept. 24, 2014), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/23445/A-new-theme-forMeFi-Modern [http://perma.cc/BQ5D-MRRA].
BEST OF METAFILTER, http://bestof.metafilter.com [http://perma.cc/WHM6264S].
@MetaFilter, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/metafilter [https://perma.cc/5X
4V-G2DC].
ASK METAFILTER, http://ask.metafilter.com [http://perma.cc/2J27-EWKB].
See Leiser Silva, Lakshmi Goel & Elham Mousavidin, Exploring the Dynamics of Blog Communities: The Case of MetaFilter, 19 INFO. SYS. J. 55,
67-73 (2008) (describing debates shaping norms of “good” and “bad” posts).
See Lawton, supra note 243, at 70-85; Warnick, supra note 20, at 89-91
(breaking down rhetorical functions of MetaTalk posts).
See MetaFilter FAQ, supra note 232.
See id.
Create a New User, METAFILTER, http://www.metafilter.com/newuser.mefi
[http://perma.cc/BQ5D-MRRA].
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munity.253 Those who misbehave have their accounts deactivated, no refunds offered. The real pricing consists of some lightweight advertising.254 Most ads are hidden for members;255 the
site sustains itself primarily on the revenue from outsiders who
come across particular pages on web searches.256
MetaFilter’s treatment of identity is carefully modulated. It
is easy to browse a user’s history of posts and comments, and
some users choose to decorate their profiles with detailed information about themselves,257 but the default is persistent
pseudonymity.258 Members are known primarily by their
usernames, such that dedicated discussants can build up extensive reputations on MetaFilter without revealing their reallife identities. In one part of the site, however, these rules are
suspended: members can post anonymous questions on AskMetaFilter—just the thing for seeking advice on an abusive relationship or a difficult workplace issue.259 Because of the decreased norm-based constraints on abusive questions, anonymous questions go through ex ante human moderator review

253

254

255
256

257

258
259

See Hannah Pileggi, Brianna Morrison & Amy Bruckman, Deliberate Barriers to User Participation on MetaFilter (Georgia Institute of Technology
School of Interactive Computing, Technical Report No. GT-IC-14-01 2014),
https://smartech.gatech.edu/handle/1853/50776 [https://perma.cc/E55N-C
BUR].
See How Does Advertising on MetaFilter Work?, METAFILTER FAQ,
http://faq.metafilter.com/130/how-does-advertising-on-metafilter-work
[http://perma.cc/AB92-6HSF].
Id.
MetaFilter’s biggest threat currently comes not from internal community
dynamics but from a shift in the online advertising ecosystem. In November 2012, Google changed its ranking algorithms in a way that appears to
have significantly demoted MetaFilter, instantly slashing the site’s traffic
from non-members and with it, the site’s advertising revenue. See Matt
Haughey, On the Future of MetaFilter, MEDIUM (May 21, 2014),
https://medium.com/technology-musings/on-the-future-of-metafilter-941d1
5ec96f0 [https://perma.cc/G28F-8USR]. Haughey was forced to lay off
three members of the already small moderation staff as a result. See
mathowie [Matt Haughey], The State of MetaFilter, METATALK (May 19,
2014), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/23245/State-of-MetaFilter [http://per
ma.cc/JA6V-R5YH]. The exact reason for the decline in MetaFitler’s
Google rankings remains unclear. The change seems to have been unintentional on Google’s part, but Google has not acted decisively to fix it. See
Danny Sullivan, On MetaFilter Being Penalized By Google: An Explainer,
SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 22, 2014), http://searchengineland.com/metafil
ter-penalized-google-192168 [http://perma.cc/2RNQ-WPJ9].
See Noor Ali-Hasan, MetaFilter: Analysis of a Community Weblog (2005),
http://www.nooratwork.com/pdf/ali-hasan_metafilter.pdf [http://perma.cc
/7SRF-PHDE].
See MetaFilter FAQ, supra note 232.
Id.; akomom, confused about how to successfully ask anonymously, ASK
METAFILTER (Mar. 27, 2012), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/21588/confuse
d-about-how-to-successfully-ask-anonymously [http://perma.cc/5YJ6-CZZ2].
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rather than ex post.260 “Anonymous questions are for basic privacy, not for hiding from Interpol.”261
Overall, MetaFilter is a moderation success story. In 2013,
it had about 40,000 active users, who created about 11,000
posts and 600,000 comments.262 The flow of posts is consistently interesting but not overwhelming. Although the site is occasionally challenged by vandals or infiltrated by marketers, it is
for the most part an authentic conversation among engaged
participants. Users have been known to spend weeks crafting
massive posts that do deep dives on a topic, collecting hundreds
of related links into a perfectly curated collection.263 In 2001,
the MetaFilter community collaboratively exposed an Internet
hoax—a fictional teenager with equally fictional terminal leukemia.264 The site has been self-sustaining for years, and there
are strong feelings of belonging and community among active
posters. There are face-to-face meet-ups in major (and minor)
cities,265 a rich vocabulary of references and in-jokes,266 a holiday gift exchange called Secret Quonsar,267 and at least one
260
261
262

263

264

265

266

267

See MetaFilter FAQ, supra note 232.
Id.
See MetaFilter Stats 2013, MEFI LABS, http://labs.metafilter.com/mefi-stat
s-2013 [http://perma.cc/GG7T-4JYB].
For a particularly outstanding example, see Miko, Alice’s Restaurant,
METAFILTER (Nov. 25, 2010), http://www.metafilter.com/97904/Alices-Rest
aurant [http://perma.cc/5FKC-EZ6X], a post celebrating the Arlo Guthrie
song “Alice’s Restaurant” by extensively hyperlinking the song’s lyrics; see
also What Is a Good Post, MEFI WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/What_Is_A
_Good_Post [http://perma.cc/D5WB-QGDN]; Posting Guidelines, METAFILTER, http://www.metafilter.com/guidelines.mefi [http://perma.cc/H52NT8S5].
See acidrabbit, Is it possible that Kaycee did not exist?, METAFILTER (May
19, 2001), http://www.metafilter.com/7819/Is-it-possible-that-Kaycee-didnot-exist [http://perma.cc/A74A-J9SM]; Katie Hafner, A Beautiful Life, an
Early Death, a Fraud Exposed, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2001, http://www.nyti
mes.com/2001/05/31/technology/a-beautiful-life-an-early-death-a-fraudexposed.html [http://perma.cc/K3MV-QMJS].
Indeed, MetaFilter has an entire subsite devoted to meetups. MEFIIRL,
http://irl.metafilter.com [http://perma.cc/BS3W-ENYL]; see also Lauren F.
Sessions, How Offline Gatherings Affect Online Communities, 13 INFO.,
COMM., & SOC. 375-95 (2010) (analyzing the effect of meetups on the
MetaFilter community).
See In Jokes, MEFI WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/In_Jokes [http://perma
.cc/9KBM-C8K8]. For example, “Pepsi Blue” is “a sort of catch-all cat-call
for something that is a possible shill posting on MetaFilter—that is, an ad
or product endorsement for reasons other than just overall consumer joy.”
See Pepsi Blue, MEFI WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/Pepsi_Blue [http://per
ma.cc/F7NT-QWNM]. More seriously, it is common to leave comments
consisting solely of a period, as a moment of silent mourning. See The Period, MEFI WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/The_Period [http://perma.cc/7LY
K-H9BW].
See Secret Quonsar, MEFI WIKI, http://mefiwiki.com/wiki/Secret_Quonsar
[http://perma.cc/U4TV-2KQF]. Quonsar was the username of a prolific, if
problematic, MetaFilter user. See Lawton, supra note 243, at 100.
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marriage of users who met through MetaFilter.268 It is a strikingly different kind of community than Wikipedia with strikingly different moderation, but it also works.
D.

Reddit

If the Portland-based MetaFilter is artisanal small-batch
news, then the San Francisco-based Reddit is crowd-sourced
post-industrial news.269 Instead of MetaFilter’s loving, centralized, ex post, human moderation with a strong emphasis on
norm-setting, Reddit depends on finely machined, distributed,
ex post, algorithmic moderation with a strong emphasis on annotation and filtering.270 The contrast between them shows
both the diversity of moderation and some of its recurring challenges.
Reddit’s users moderate primarily by voting on content.271
Each post and each comment are accompanied by two arrows.
Click the up arrow, and the item gains an “upvote”; click the
down arrow, and the item gains a “downvote.” Reddit uses the
upvotes and downvotes to determine the order in which posts
and comments are displayed.272 Well-liked posts bubble to the
top and are seen by more users; disliked ones are rapidly driven down to invisibility. This is ex post, distributed, human annotation, used as an input to centralize automatic filtration.
The algorithm that weights upvotes and downvotes has been
carefully tuned both to maintain a fresh flow of new content

268

269
270

271

272

See MrMoonPie, the wedding of NortonDC and onlyconnect, who met at a
meetup, METATALK (Sept. 24, 2005), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/10231
[http://perma.cc/8EZL-C7EP].
REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com [http://perma.cc/7QL4-JCJK].
See generally Tom Lamont, Reddit: How to Win the Internet, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 7, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/07/red
dit-how-to-win-the-internet [http://perma.cc/M2MN-JYZV].
See Frequently Asked Questions, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/wiki/faq
[http://perma.cc/4UDT-7JV8] [hereinafter Reddit FAQ].
Id. This core idea of upvotes and downvotes has been in widespread use
for years. Slashdot, a social news site, pioneered the extensive reliance on
algorithms to sort comments. See generally Lampe, supra note 84. Slashdot’s system grew particularly baroque over time: it developed a system of
“meta-moderation,” in which users would examine each others’ moderation decisions and then vote on whether those decisions were correct or incorrect. Users whose decisions were frequently voted correct would receive
“karma” points, which in turn allowed them to moderate and metamoderate more frequently. Id. For further discussion of karma systems,
see FARMER & GLASS, supra note 16, at 75-82. Reddit passes posts themselves through the voting algorithm, not just comments. Thus, unlike on
Slashdot or MetaFilter, where every post has been vetted or even edited
by moderators affiliated with the site, the choice of which Reddit posts are
prominent is in the hands of the voting algorithm. This is not unique to
Reddit—the social news site Digg.com had it first—but it is characteristic
of Reddit.
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and to keep early votes from disproportionately influencing a
post’s or comment's fate.273
Reddit also relies on a layer of distributed organization.
Any user can create a “subreddit” devoted to discussion on a
particular topic.274 Within the subreddit, the usual upvote and
downvote mechanics apply, but moderators also enjoy substantial editorial discretion: they can remove “objectionable or off
topic” comments and ban abusive users from the subreddit.275
This, in effect, splits Reddit into a large number of smaller
communities, each combining automated filtration with human
deletion.276 It also makes exiting an appealing option within
Reddit: users who dislike a subreddit can easily avoid it.277
There are a few other techniques in use on Reddit, but they
occupy subsidiary roles. The site has a custom advertising platform that allows either generic site-wide advertising or advertising targeted at the users of particular subreddits.278 It also
273

274
275
276

277

278

For explanations of the algorithmic details, see Michael Billard, Reddit’s
Empire No Longer Founded on a Flawed Algorithm, OUT OF SCOPE, Feb.
16, 2014, http://www.outofscope.com/reddits-empire-no-longer-founded-ona-flawed-algorithm [http://perma.cc/2SNA-LYN3]; Randall Munroe, Reddit’s New Comment Sorting System, REDDIT BLOG (Oct. 15, 2009),
http://www.redditblog.com/2009/10/reddits-new-comment-sorting-system
.html [http://perma.cc/2MZR-KYWX]; Jonathan Rochkind, Reddit’s Actual? (Or a Variation?) Story Ranking Algorithm Explained (Significant Typos in Previously Published Version (Or Not)), BIBLIOGRAPHIC WILDERNESS
(May 8, 2012), http://bibwild.wordpress.com/2012/05/08/reddit-story-rank
ing-algorithm [http://perma.cc/8MFX-CHFS]; and Amir Salihefendic, How
Reddit Ranking Algorithms Work, HACKING AND GONZO (Nov. 23, 2010),
http://amix.dk/blog/post/19588 [http://perma.cc/ECF5-HTAS].
See Reddit FAQ, supra note 271.
Id.
See Moderation, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/wiki/moderation [http://pe
rma.cc/9R3Q-74ND]. Users, in turn, can combine up to 100 subreddits into
a personal “front page” that brings together posts from all of the subreddits they follow—another form of filtration. See Reddit FAQ, supra note
271. Users who are not logged in see a default front page combining posts
from a curated list of fifty subreddits. See cupcake1713 [Alex Angel],
What’s That, Lassie? The Old Defaults Fell Down a Well?, REDDIT BLOG
(May 7, 2014), http://www.redditblog.com/2014/05/whats-that-lassie-olddefaults-fell.html [http://perma.cc/X87N-ETZU]. There are also quotas on
the number of front-page posts from each subreddit to prevent the largest
and most popular subreddits from dominating the front page. See Todd W.
Schneider, The Reddit Front Page Is Not a Meritocracy, TODD W. SCHNEIDER (Nov. 6, 2014), http://toddwschneider.com/posts/the-reddit-front-pageis-not-a-meritocracy [http://perma.cc/8LSB-47FS].
See Adrian Chen, Reddit CEO Speaks Out On Violentacrez In Leaked
Memo: 'We Stand for Free Speech', GAWKER, Oct. 16, 2012, http://gawker
.com/5952349/reddit-ceo-speaks-out-on-violentacrez-in-leaked-memo-westand-for-free-speech [http://perma.cc/XH2A-KTA9].
See Advertise, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/advertising [http://perma.cc/
QU5Q-HCET]; Mike Isaac, Can Reddit Grow Up?, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/technology/can-reddit-grow-up
.html [http://perma.cc/E2JQ-K3MD].
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implements pricing through a “Gold” membership tier for $3.99
per month that hides ads and gives users a few more sophisticated filtration choices.279 The site uses a spam filter to delete
automated posts, and it fights hard against voting manipulation (such as using multiple accounts to upvote a post).280 User
accounts are banned for abuse (i.e., excluded),281 and if a website is caught repeatedly trying to manipulate its way onto
Reddit, the entire domain may be banned: all links to it are deleted ex ante on sight.282 Norm-building meetups take place,
but given the sheer size of the Reddit community, they reach
only a small portion of the user population.283
In many ways, Reddit is transparent. Its source code, for
example, is made publicly available.284 But there is a strong
undercurrent of opacity. A few operational details are shrouded
in secrecy to protect the voting system from being gamed. Thus,
actual upvote and downvote totals are “fuzzed” so that users
cannot tell exactly which tactics are successfully getting past
the vote-cheating detectors.285 The site sometimes shadowbans
spammers, letting them think their accounts are active and
working, while quietly deleting their posts and ignoring their
votes.286 Individual subreddit moderators frequently push their
personal political agendas by using their power to secretly delete content. Moderators have even been known to take bribes
in exchange for promoting particular content.287
Something about the combination works.288 After a few
years of steady growth following its 2005 founding, Reddit took
279

280
281
282

283

284

285
286

287

288

See Gold, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/gold/about [http://perma.cc/Z9H4
-AKY5].
See Reddit FAQ, supra note 271.
See id.
See, e.g., Peter Bright, Year-Long E-Sports Site Ban Shows the Dangers of
Gaming Reddit, ARS TECHNICA, July 3, 2014, http://arstechnica.com/gam
ing/2014/07/year-long-e-sports-site-ban-shows-the-dangers-of-gaming-red
dit [http://perma.cc/F933-VKYA].
See, e.g., Matthew Shaer, Reddit in the Flesh, N.Y. MAG., July 8, 2012,
http://nymag.com/news/features/reddit-2012-7 [http://perma.cc/N9TT-ZB2
M].
See Reddit—Reddit, GITHUB, https://github.com/reddit/reddit [https://perm
a.cc/Z4D7-2LHD].
See Reddit FAQ, supra note 271.
See User Specific FAQs, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/help/wiki/faq
[http://perma.cc/M8KG-72LG]. See also cojoco, An Unofficial Guide on
How to Avoid Being Shadowbanned, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/Sha
dowBan/comments/1x92jy/an_unofficial_guide_on_how_to_avoid_being
[http://perma.cc/SF3M-2YX5].
See, e.g., David Auerbach, Does Reddit Have a Transparency Problem?,
SLATE, Oct. 9, 2014, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology
/2014/10/reddit_scandals_does_the_site_have_a_transparency_problem.ht
ml [http://perma.cc/EHL8-2KSN].
For an example of Reddit at its best, see Kevin Morris, The Greatest Story
Reddit Ever Told, THE KERNEL, Nov. 2, 2014, http://kernelmag.dailydot
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off like a rocket in the early 2010s.289 Where MetaFilter is a
water fountain, Reddit is a firehose. In 2013, Reddit had over 2
million users who made 41 million posts, 400 million comments, and 6.7 billion votes.290 Reddit’s “Ask Me Anything”
crowd-sourced interviews have featured everyone from President Obama291 to Jerry Seinfeld,292 and one literally epic Reddit
thread—who would win in a fight between a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit and the Roman Empire?—was optioned by
Warner Brothers.293
The contrast between MetaFilter and Reddit is striking.
Even though they have broadly similar missions—threaded
discussions about things from around the web—the two sites
have succeeded as communities for very different reasons.
Metafilter relies on its core team of administrators to set consistent rules and norms across the site. Reddit, on the other
hand, is built to scale. Its site-wide administrators tweak the
algorithms occasionally but avoid almost all individual moderation decisions. All of those decisions are delegated either to the
ranking algorithms or to the moderators of subreddits. MetaFilter works because almost all of its users want it to work, because its moderators are personally attuned to its users’ interests, and because it offers a single coherent community. Reddit
works because many of its users want it to work, because its
algorithms are well-tuned to reflect its users’ overall preferences, and because its subreddits are compartmentalized from
each others’ failures.
Every community has to deal with abuse. Reddit’s responses show both the power and the limits of its moderation tech-

289

290

291

292

293

.com/issue-sections/headline-story/10727/dante-orpilla-youngluck-reddit
gifts/ [http://perma.cc/MH7A-KHAQ].
See Farhad Manjoo, The Great and Powerful Reddit, SLATE, Jan. 19, 2012,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2012/01/reddit_how_t
he_site_went_from_a_second_tier_aggregator_to_the_web_s_unstoppable_
force_.html [http://perma.cc/5BP9-TWUP].
See hueypriest [Erik Martin], Top Posts of 2013, Stats, and Snoo Year's
Resolutions, REDDIT BLOG (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.redditblog.com/2013
/12/top-posts-of-2013-stats-and-snoo-years.html [http://perma.cc/Q5CX-GT
QH].
See I am Barack Obama, President of the United States—AMA, REDDIT,
http://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/z1c9z/i_am_barack_obama_presi
dent_of_the_united_states [http://perma.cc/4FEF-6B8P].
See Jerry Seinfeld here. I will give you an answer., REDDIT, http://www.red
dit.com/r/IAmA/comments/1ujvrg/jerry_seinfeld_here_i_will_give_you_an_
answer [http://perma.cc/CS2E-Y7XM]; see generally Ryan Holiday, Inside
the Reddit AMA: The Interview Revolution That Has Everyone Talking,
FORBES, May 1, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanholiday/2012/05/01
/inside-the-reddit-ama-the-interview-revolution-that-has-everyone-talking
[http://perma.cc/EVE4-V8CU].
See Jason Fagone, How One Response to a Reddit Query Became a BigBudget Flick, WIRED, Mar. 20, 2012, http://www.wired.com/2012/03/ff_red
dit/all [http://perma.cc/EVE4-V8CU].
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niques. On the one hand, the combination of decentralization
and filtering is often effective in enabling users to avoid content they dislike. While sometimes users choose to stay and argue over the direction of a subreddit, on the whole, exit dominates over voice.294 Reddit invites dissatisfied users to “consider
making a new subreddit and shaping it the way you'd like rather than performing a sit-in and/or witch hunt.”295
Reddit therefore adopts a strongly libertarian official attitude toward free speech.296 The administrators will not intervene to remove content. Users who dislike something are expected to avoid it rather than seek to have it removed. The only
exception is when there is a legal requirement to remove content, and even then, the administrators make a show of acting
only when compelled to.297 Relatedly, Reddit users are encouraged to protect their privacy with pseudonymity. “It is thought
bad form on Reddit to reveal your real name,”298 and there is a
strong norm against “doxxing”—revealing personal information
about members without their consent.299
But if these features—strong subreddit communities, tolerance of differing views, and pseudonymous speech—make Reddit effective at defusing internal conflicts and catalyzing internal cooperation, they can make it downright dangerous to outsiders. Reddit is passionate about creating strong communities
but completely indifferent as to whether those communities collaborate for good or for ill. After the Aurora shooting, Reddit
was a leading source for sorting through the chaos of conflict-

294

295
296

297

298
299

See Grimmelmann, Anarchy, supra note 25 (describing a controversy
within /r/politics subreddit after moderators banned links from the leftleaning Mother Jones).
Id.
See, e.g., yishan [Yishan Wong], Fundraising for Reddit, REDDIT BLOG
(Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.redditblog.com/2014/09/fundraising-for-reddit
.html [http://perma.cc/FA9E-B2NS] (“We believe in free speech, selfgoverning communities, and the power of voting.”); Morris, supra note 288
(“The site’s founders . . . instilled an institutional devotion to ideals of free
speech, turning Reddit into an online petri dish for experiments in
stretching the First Amendment to its breaking point.”).
This ethos made Reddit a crucial nexus in the online protests that halted
the copyright-filtering bills SOPA and PIPA in 2012. Reddit was the first
major site to announce a blackout for the day of protest. See Stopped they
must be; on this all depends, REDDIT BLOG (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.red
ditblog.com/2012/01/stopped-they-must-be-on-this-all.html [http://perma
.cc/Z9FD-NLR7]; see also Tom Cheredar, Reddit Goes Black Jan. 18 to
Protest SOPA & PIPA—Who else will join?, VENTUREBEAT, Jan. 10, 2012,
http://venturebeat.com/2012/01/10/reddit-blackout-sopa-pipa [http://perma
.cc/2JT6-3ZFH].
Lamont, supra note 270.
See C. S.-W., What Doxxing Is, and Why It Matters, THE ECONOMIST, Mar.
10, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/03/eco
nomist-explains-9 [http://perma.cc/T9X3-XBJJ].
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ing reports.300 But after the Boston Marathon bombing, an ad
hoc community of Reddit users misidentified a missing Brown
undergraduate, Sunil Tripathi, as one of the bombers, touching
off a media firestorm and causing his family great distress.301
In some cases, entire subreddits are devoted to illegal and
immoral purposes. Take /r/jailbait, which featured “sexually
suggestive pictures of teenage girls, most of whom appear[ed]
to be under the age of 18.”302 After CNN’s Anderson Cooper ran
an expose on /r/jailbait in 2011, its traffic spiked. Eventually
Reddit staff shut it down amid allegations that users were
trading actual child pornography.303 A year later, the creator of
/r/jailbait, a user with the name violentacrez, became involved
in a similar controversy over /r/creepshots, “where users posted
covert photos they had taken of women in public . . . for a voyeuristic sexual thrill.”304 This time, journalist Adrian Chen
identified the person behind the violentacrez account, a programmer from Texas named Michael Brutsch.305 The initial response from many subreddit moderators was defensive: they
banned links to Gawker on the grounds that the story violated
violentacrez’s privacy.306 Indeed, for a while, Reddit itself
banned links to Gawker because of the unmasking.307 In the
end, the bad publicity was too much to withstand. Brutsch was
fired from his job at a financial services company, Gawker was
unbanned, and /r/creepshots was deleted.308 But the story
300
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302
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See Jay Caspian Kang, Should Reddit Be Blamed for the Spreading of a
Smear?, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/m
agazine/should-reddit-be-blamed-for-the-spreading-of-a-smear.html [http:
//perma.cc/RU9Y-SJZS].
Id.
See Kevin Morris, Anderson Cooper Addresses Reddit’s Teen Pics Section,
THE DAILY DOT, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.dailydot.com/news/andersoncooper-jailbait-reddit [http://perma.cc/V59S-X4BL].
See Kevin Morris, Reddit Shuts Down Teen Pics Section, THE DAILY DOT,
Oct. 11, 2011, http://www.dailydot.com/society/reddit-r-jailbait-shutdowncontroversy [http://perma.cc/DY2M-XAET].
Adrian Chen, Unmasking Reddit's Violentacrez, The Biggest Troll on the
Web, GAWKER, Oct. 12, 2012, http://gawker.com/5950981/unmasking-reddi
ts-violentacrez-the-biggest-troll-on-the-web [http://perma.cc/Z457-87XA].
Id.
See Kevin Morris, Clearing up Rumors and Hearsay as the Internet Eagerly Awaits the Gawker Reddit Story, THE DAILY DOT, Oct. 12, 2012, http://
www.dailydot.com/news/reddit-adrian-chen-violentacrez-gawker-rumors
[http://perma.cc/2JUL-NAQL].
See Katie Notopoulos, Leaked Reddit Chat Logs Reveal Moderators’ Real Concern, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Oct. 13, 2012), http://www.buzzfeed.com/kati
enotopoulos/leaked-chat-logs-between-reddit-moderators-and-sta [http://
perma.cc/M5VQ-UXLY].
See Fernando Alfonso III, Reddit’s Most Notorious Troll Loses Job After
Gawker Profile, THE DAILY DOT, Oct. 15, 2012, http://www.dailydot.com/ne
ws/violentacrez-reddit-troll-fired-gawker-profile [http://perma.cc/J5KW-W
WZG]. But see Fernando Alfonso III, Creepshots Never Went Away—We
Just Stopped Talking About Them, THE DAILY DOT, Feb. 7, 2014, http://
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shows how toxic Reddit’s combination of tolerance and pseudonymity can be.
More recently, but just as alarmingly, Reddit played a
prominent role in the 2014 release of nude photographs of celebrities such as Jennifer Lawrence and Kirsten Dunst. The
photos were initially stolen by a loose-knit coalition of hackers
who scour the Internet looking for enough personal information
to gain access to the victims’ online accounts.309 The photos
might have stayed hidden within the hackers’ semi-private
networks had it not been for the Reddit user johnsmcjohn, who
created the /r/TheFappening subreddit to share them.310 Within
a day, the subreddit had tens of thousands of members.311 Reddit’s official response was a masterpiece of muddled messaging.
CEO Yishan Wong wrote a blog post, portentously titled “Every
Man Is Responsible For His Own Soul,” that doubled down on
Reddit’s commitment to free speech, explaining “why we will
not ban questionable subreddits, of which /r/TheFappening is
one of them.”312 Almost simultaneously, and supposedly by
complete coincidence, Reddit banned /r/TheFappening.313 The
stated reason for the ban was not that trading links to stolen
nude photographs was wrong, or that trading links to stolen
nude photographs was illegal, but that the burden of responding to DMCA takedown requests had become unsustainable in
light of users’ continual attempts to repost the photographs after each takedown.314 Wong’s explanation of Reddit’s sense of
itself is telling, and deserves to be quoted at length:
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www.dailydot.com/lifestyle/reddit-creepshots-candidfashionpolice-photos
[http://perma.cc/4B8U-CJEA].
See Nik Cubrilovic, Notes on the Celebrity Data Theft, NEW WEB ORDER
(Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.nikcub.com/posts/notes-on-the-celebrity-datatheft [https://perma.cc/5NMQ-MJH5].
See Caitlin Dewey, Meet the Unashamed 33-Year-Old Who Brought the
Stolen Celebrity Nudes to the Masses, WASH. POST., Sept. 5, 2014, http://w
ww.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/09/05/meet-the-unas
hamed-33-year-old-who-brought-the-stolen-celebrity-nudes-to-the-masses
[http://perma.cc/PK3J-6FA2]. “‘Fap’ is an onomatopoeic Internet slang
term for the act of masturbation.” Fap, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyou
rmeme.com/memes/fap [http://perma.cc/QJ6Z-G6E6].
See Rob Price, Reddit's Privacy Rules Fail as Celebrity Nudes Spread Like
Wildfire, THE DAILY DOT, Sept. 1, 2014, http://www.dailydot.com/business
/reddit-jennifer-lawrence-kate-upton-nude-photos-leak-privacy-dox-ban
[http://perma.cc/4XFQ-NTFY].
See yishan [Yishan Wong], Every Man Is Responsible For His Own Soul,
REDDIT BLOG (Sept. 6, 2014), http://www.redditblog.com/2014/09/every-ma
n-is-responsible-for-his-own.html [http://perma.cc/9HYP-T2N7].
Id.
See alienth, Time to Talk, REDDIT ANNOUNCEMENTS, https://www.reddit.co
m/r/announcements/comments/2fpdax/time_to_talk [https://perma.cc/Z68C
-Z5RD].
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The reason is because we consider ourselves
not just a company running a website where one
can post links and discuss them, but the government of a new type of community. The role and
responsibility of a government differs from that
of a private corporation, in that it exercises restraint in the usage of its powers.
...
The philosophy behind this stems from the
idea that each individual is responsible for his or
her moral actions.
We uphold the ideal of free speech on reddit
as much as possible not because we are legally
bound to, but because we believe that you—the
user—has the right to choose between right and
wrong, good and evil, and that it is your responsibility to do so. When you know something is
right, you should choose to do it. But as much as
possible, we will not force you to do it.315
If Reddit is like a nation, it has all of the best and worst
features of real ones. On the one hand, it is thriving and pluralistic, capable both of fostering diverse communities and binding
them together in a common collective project. On the other, it
turns a blind eye to terrorist training camps on its soil.316 Filibusters regularly set forth from Reddit in search of adventure
and infamy as they destabilize the rest of the Internet.
IV.

Lessons for Law

The moderation techniques presented here may seem to defy easy generalization. But it is possible to highlight a few
things that tie them together:
• Moderation is complex. The Reddit algorithm
has been finely tuned over years. So has Matt
Haughey’s situational sense of how to respond to
intemperate comments. Wikipedia’s fractious
norms have been the subject of multiple books.
The grammar of moderation in Parts II and III is
complicated because moderation itself is complicated.
• Moderation is diverse. Reddit, MetaFilter,
Google News, and The New York Times solve the
same problem in four radically different ways.
315
316

yishan, supra note 312 (emphasis in original).
See T.C. Sottek, Reddit Is a Failed State, THE VERGE, Sept. 8, 2014,
http://www.theverge.com/2014/9/8/6121363/reddit-is-a-failed-state [http://
perma.cc/J7QM-NANP].

102

THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 17

Wikipedia alone uses dozens of different moderation techniques. There is no one formula for success. Moderation contains multitudes.
• Moderation is necessary. It may be possible
for an online community to go without centralized moderation, or without ex ante moderation,
or without human moderation, or without exclusion, or without explicit pricing, or without opening any particular drawer in the moderation tool
chest. But it cannot go without moderation entirely, as the Los Angeles Times discovered. If a
successful community appears to be unmoderated, look more closely, until its implicit technical
constraints or shared norms come into focus.
• Moderation is messy. Moderation depends on
a site’s technological affordances: they shape how
members can communicate and interact. But a
community’s fate is not determined by its technology. Redditors’ passion does not come from
the voting algorithm; not all wikis are Wikipedia.
Moderation depends just as much on social
norms, and thus it is always emergent, contingent, and contestable.
• Moderation is both top-down and bottom-up.
Moderation takes place at the interface between
infrastructure and interaction. Both owners and
authors can influence a community’s course, but
neither can control it. MetaFilter would not exist
without Matt Haughey’s long stewardship. But if
he were to say, “jump!” the community would
mostly give him side-eye. A well-moderated
community is like a wildflower garden. A good
moderator can create the conditions for life, but
not life itself.
To see how these insights play out in a regulatory context,
consider the two principal legal regimes that govern online
communities: § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which
provides broad immunity for interactive computer services,317
and § 512 of the Copyright Act, which provides a copyright safe
harbor.318 Both of them seek to give communities substantial
breathing room to set their own moderation policies, but they
adopt very different attitudes and expectations towards moderators.

317
318

47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
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Communications Decency Act § 230

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) famously immunizes any “provider or user of an interactive computer service” from being treated as “the publisher or speaker”
of user-generated content.319 At the same time, it provides
equally broad immunity for “any action voluntarily taken in
good faith to restrict access to” objectionable material.320 This is
a double-pronged protection for moderation: it gives moderators
immunity both for the content they moderate and the content
they miss. The overall effect, despite the “good faith” qualifier
in the second prong, is that moderators have blanket immunity: no moderation decision can lead to liability under defamation law,321 securities law,322 civil rights law,323 consumerprotection law,324 or almost-anything law. A wide variety of
moderation techniques are protected, including paying authors,325 selective deletion,326 and extensive organization.327
The underlying policy is to encourage moderation by taking
away the threat of liability for mismoderation.328 A pre-CDA
decision held that the pre-Web service Prodigy could be held
liable for a defamatory post by a user. The court reasoned that
Prodigy was “making decisions as to content” and was therefore
a publisher of the defamatory material.329 A similar service,
CompuServe, had escaped liability because it exercised “no
more editorial control . . . than does a public library, book store,
or newsstand.”330 Taken together, the decisions created a perverse disincentive to moderate.
The CDA’s solution thus embodies three assumptions about
moderation. First, it views moderation as desirable—better to
319

320
321
322

323

324
325
326
327
328
329

330

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). My discussion focuses on § 230(c)(1), which
gives providers immunity when they fail to remove objectionable content.
For a useful discussion of § 230(c)(2), which gives providers immunity
when they act in good faith to remove objectionable content, see Eric
Goldman, Online User Account Termination and 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), 2
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 659 (2012) (describing and defending this immunity as
applied to exclusion).
Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).
E.g., Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
E.g., Universal Commc’n Systems v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir.
2007).
E.g., Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th
Cir. 2008) (en banc).
E.g., Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
E.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
E.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
E.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *4
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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have Prodigies and not just CompuServes. Second, it treats
moderation as fallible. Even if Prodigy can find and remove
some offensive posts, it is all but certain to miss others. Third,
it believes that looking over moderators’ shoulders is ill advised. Rather than trying to enforce a reasonable-moderator
standard of conduct, § 230 says that any moderation, even donothing moderation, is good enough.
In light of the discussion above, the first two assumptions
are eminently justified: moderation is necessary, and moderation is messy. These are close to universal laws of moderation.
A regulatory scheme that does not take them into account
verges on madness. But the third assumption is more contestable. On the one hand, moderation’s complexity and diversity
counsel regulatory caution. A judicially enforced standard of
conduct risks flattening out distinctions among communities
and moderators, thereby stomping on valuable experiments in
self-governance.331 On the other hand, moderators really do
have some power. Some gardeners grow lilies; others grow
nightshade.
Take the late and little-lamented Is Anyone Up, a website
dedicated
to
revenge
porn.332
Like/r/jailbait
and
/r/TheFappening, it was a toxic community built on criminal
conduct. Moderation made it better for participants and worse
for the rest of the world. This is not a kind of collaboration society should encourage. Is Anyone Up’s operator, Hunter Moore,
pleaded guilty to federal hacking and identity theft charges for
paying a co-conspirator to steal nude photos and post them to
Is Anyone Up.333 But should his liability turn on his personal
involvement? The site itself was illegitimate, the privacy
equivalent of a service “good for nothing else but infringement.”334 Moore moderated it with malice aforethought. There
is a pragmatic question of whether it is feasible for the judicial
system to distinguish the Is Anyone Ups of the world from the
Prodigies, but the question is really one about how much we
wish to subject moderation to judicial review.335 It seems un331
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See H. Brian Holland, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 369
(2008).
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likely that § 230’s across-the-board immunity is ideal. Even if
in many cases judges are poorly situated to second-guess moderation decisions, they should not be writing blank checks to
moderators like Hunter Moore, violentacrez, and johnsmcjohn.336 Moderation to please a community’s insiders is not the
same as moderation to protect outsiders, and we need not treat
them the same.
Another way in which § 230 currently exhibits too much
deference to bad-faith moderation is illustrated by Jones v.
Dirty World.337 The Dirty is a website that features userprovided “Dirty Army intel, opinions, gossip, satire, and celebrities.” It is edited by Nik Lamas-Richie.338 A user submitted
photographs of the plaintiff, Sarah Jones, along with a note
reading, “Nik, this is Sara J, Cincinnati Bengal Cheerleader.
She's been spotted around town lately with the infamous
Shayne Graham. She has also slept with every other Bengal
Football player.”339 Richie added his own comments: “Everyone
in Cincinnati knows this kicker is a Sex Addict.”340 Another user submitted a photograph of Jones with the comment, “Her ex
Nate.. cheated on her with over 50 girls in 4 yrs.. in that time
he tested positive for Chlamydia Infection and Gonorrhea.. so
im sure Sarah also has both.. whats worse is he brags about
doing sarah in the gym.. football field.. her class room at the
school she teaches at DIXIE Heights.”341 Richie posted these
along with his own comment: “Why are all high school teachers
freaks in the sack?nik.”342 There was more, but you get the picture.
Jones repeatedly complained to Richie, who refused to remove the posts. Under the prevailing judicial interpretation of
§ 230, he was clearly in the right, as the Sixth Circuit confirmed when Jones sued for defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.343 All of the offending
posts were written by users. It did not matter that Richie added his own comments, because his own comments were not defamatory. If moderators were forbidden to post to their own
sites on pain of losing their § 230 immunity, they would lose a
powerful tool for norm-setting. It did not matter that Richie
336
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refused to remove the posts after being notified because § 230
makes no distinction based on notice.344 If notice took away
immunity, high-volume sites would be easy targets for a heckler’s veto. Moderators who were unable to review notices carefully would simply remove any content that was the subject of a
notice.345
These two rationales for blanket immunity are individually
well taken, but considered together, they contradict each other.
Richie’s defense rests on the simultaneous claims that human
moderation is desirable and that human moderation is impossible. Both cannot be true at the same time. By individually
commenting on the posts about Jones, Richie provided active,
human moderation. In so doing, he showed that he is not the
kind of moderator for whom immunity even after notice was
designed. We know that individual review of the usersubmitted posts about Jones is feasible because Richie himself
had already engaged in just such a review when he posted and
commented on them.
Section 230, then, should perhaps apply differently to automated moderation and human moderation. For automated
moderation, immunity even after notice can potentially be justified. If a website does not already use human moderation,
goes the argument, it should not be forced to. At the scale of a
YouTube or a Reddit, such a mandate could be debilitating. But
where a specific post has already been the subject of human
moderation, the argument for immunity after notice is weaker.
The website’s own actions show that it is capable of providing
substantive human review. This is not an argument for going
back to the world before § 230, in which Prodigy could be held
liable as a publisher (liable even without notice) because it
used human moderation. The point is narrower: websites like
The Dirty that rely extensively on content-specific human curation could be treated as distributors (liable after notice) without
undercutting the core rationales of § 230.346 Thus, even if
Richie should not have been liable for the initial postings, there
is a stronger case that he should have been liable for failing to
remove them.347

See Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 331-34 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the argument that notice defeats immunity).
345 Id. at 333.
346 For a detailed and thoughtful discussion of those rationales, see Felix T.
Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293 (2011).
347 Assuming, that is, that the posts were defamatory—an assumption we
must make when considering the threshold question of Section 230 immunity.
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Not all moderation is the same. Insights like these are possible only when we delve into the details of how different communities are moderated differently.
B.

Copyright Act § 512

The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation
Act, codified at § 512 of the Copyright Act, takes a rather different approach. It offers online “service provider[s]” immunity
from copyright infringement for user-uploaded content.348 But
unlike § 230’s blanket immunity, § 512’s is shot through with
exceptions. The provider must “respond[] expeditiously to remove” material that is the subject of a notice of infringement.349
It must also have a policy for terminating the accounts of “repeat infringer[s].”350 The safe harbor is suspended when the
provider has knowledge of specific infringing activity and does
nothing,351 or when it has both a “financial benefit directly attributable to” the infringement and the “right and ability to
control” it.352 At the same time, § 512 limits moderators’ duties
to these specified ones. They need not “affirmatively seek[]
facts indicating infringing activity.”353
In moderation terms, § 512 specifies particular moderation
strategies that a provider must use. It must use ex post deletion
when it receives notices or knowledge of infringement, and it
must use ex post exclusion against repeat infringers. The financial benefit test is a restriction on pricing: it rules out moderation models with prices that can be too “directly” linked to infringing material. The underlying assumption, in common with
§ 230, is that infringement-screening moderation is both desirable and necessarily imperfect. But § 512 more realistically
recognizes that not all moderators will voluntarily adopt the
law’s goals—some users, and some moderators, are all for infringement.
Again, the survey of moderation shows some substantial
wisdom in § 512’s approach. In particular, by specifying particular moderation techniques rather than requiring perfect compliance or setting forth a vague standard for judicial elaboration, § 512 gives moderators clear and realistic orders.
Takedown notices and repeat-infringer suspensions are susceptible to straightforward automated enforcement. The choice of
ex post over ex ante moderation also simplifies the moderation
task: required activity is triggered only by specific events. At
the same time, § 512’s design also pushes moderation in some
348
349
350
351
352
353

17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
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perhaps unintended directions. The red-flag knowledge test
discourages moderators from looking too closely at content on
their sites lest they become liable for knowing of infringement
and failing to remove it—thereby discouraging hands-on moderation for other considerations, such as cultivating positive
community norms.
Copyright owners have been frustrated by the rule that
intermediaries have no duty to search for infringing content,354
even though such a duty would create potentially crippling
legal uncertainty.355 Interestingly, YouTube’s ContentID
system now blocks uploaded videos that match an extensive list
of copyrighted works.356 YouTube has, in effect, invented
around § 512’s ex ante/ex post distinction, a move that was
feasible because of advances in computing power and contentmatching algorithms.357 This is a good example of a moderation
technique that would be hard to mandate directly. Any court
looking at ContentID would be hard-pressed to explain whether
its matching algorithms were too aggressive or not aggressive
enough in general, let alone in any specific case.358 But even
where specific commands are unworkable, the general principle
is reasonable. A good legal regime for moderation should find
ways to encourage both the development of better moderation
techniques and the deployment of ones that already exist.
V.

Conclusion

The patterns of moderation, at once enabling and constraining, are like the basic steps of a dance. They can be combined in
an infinite number of ways, and a skilled dancer can always
find new and surprising variations, but the audience member
who knows the steps can recognize how the dance brings them
together. This Article, then, is an initial dance lesson for legal
scholars. The grammar of moderation provides a convenient
way to reason about online communities: it directs attention to
significant features and makes tentative predictions about
354
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what certain forms of moderation are likely to do. The theory of
moderation should be applicable to such matters as network
neutrality, regulation of social software, intermediary liability,
online privacy, and media policy. It may also be useful in describing the institutional options open to communities dealing
with the management of offline resources.
We should not expect so subtle a term as “moderation” to
have only one meaning. This Article has dealt with “moderation” as practiced by moderators, those who bring order to a
discussion. But “moderation” is also a matter of being moderate, “avoidance of excess or extremes in behaviour.”359 Online
communities are caught between freedom and control, openness and closure, abundance and scarcity. The theory of moderation presented in this Article emphasizes that none of these
oppositions is ever absolute. No community is ever perfectly
open or perfectly closed; moderation always takes place somewhere in between.
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